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A
D E F E N C E

Of the late

Dr. SAMUEL CLARKE,

Against the REPLY of

Sieur LEWIS-PHILIP THUMMIG,

In F A V O U R of

Mr. L E I B N I T Z.

W I T H

That REPLY, in *French* and *English*.

To which is added,

An original Letter from Mr. LEIBNITZ.

“Hearing the Reason of the Case with *Patience*
“and Unprejudicedness, is an Equity which Men
“owe to every *Truth* that can in any Manner con-
“cern them; and which is necessary to the Discovery
“of every kind of *Error*.” Dr. Clarke’s Demon-
stration, &c.

L O N D O N:

Printed for J. and P. KNAPTON, at the
Crown in Ludgate-Street. 1744.

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T H E

I N T R O D U C T I O N .

HOW the following Letter came to my Hand, and why it made not an earlier Appearance from the Press, is of little Consequence to relate. Perhaps an Apology to the Public, for printing it at all, may be more necessary than the Reasons for delaying it till this Time; a Time in which Men seem not overfond of speculative or abstracted Enquiries. Metaphysique is become an odious Name, ridiculous to most Men, and is never an Employment to the Thoughts of any, who are not patient in thinking. It is too remote from the busy Scenes of Life, from

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the pleasurable Forms Imagination can create, and from all fabulous Entertainment, from Mirth or Gallantry, to command the Attention of the present Age.

If the Sciences, if Learning, Virtue, Piety, were more encouraged, more the Subject of common Conversation, I can easily perceive the Result of much Good, but no Injury to Men or Manners. To be knowing and sensible, to be serious at Times, can be no Disparagement; they are lovely Qualities, far more engaging than the false Allurements of Foppery in Dress, or a vast Volubility of Speech upon Trifles.

*But, it may be ask'd, " why of
" all Studies should Metaphysics be
" recommended to us; a dry, barren
" Study, so remote from the Objects
" of Sense?" I answer, it is
the*

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*the greatest Improvement of, and the highest Entertainment to the Understanding of a rational Being. It opens a new World to the Mind of Man; it removes the most uneasy Doubts concerning the Causes of Things; it is the proper Food and Culture of the Understanding, the noblest Faculty Men possess. "For the Dominions of Reason do far exceed the Limits of Nature; the intelligible World is vastly farther extended, and more diffusive than the sensible World; and the Understanding contemplates many more Things than the Sense."**

"Whence came it then to fall into an almost universal Contempt"? Because it requires Patience, Thoughtfulness, and a serious

* Barrow's Mathematical Lectures.

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Disposition of Mind. To such Qualities we owe a Newton, a Clarke, a Lock: Qualities never despised by reasoning Men, or Men of good Sense and Learning. It is true the Schoolmen fram'd horrid Systems of Metaphysics, a System of hard Words, useless, unintelligible: These Men greatly injur'd the Reputation of a noble Science. To reason justly from a clear Conception of Things, or to be a just Reasoner, is to be a good Metaphysician. Read Newton's general Scholia, Clarke's Philosophical Papers, Mr. Lock's Essay upon human Understanding, and say, what is there ridiculous, contemptible, unworthy of our Study, in those Metaphysical Writings? Truth, Reason, Demonstration, Certainty, Conviction, belong equally to this, as to the Mathematical Sciences. Barrow, in his
seventh

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seventh Mathematical Lecture, speaks of Metaphysics, as a "higher and " more universal Science" than Geometry. " Metaphysics is, or ought " to be, the Treasure of the most general and simple Notions; and is " therefore by Aristotle nam'd the " Mistress of all Sciences; by Proclus, " the one Science from which others " receive their Principles."

For the Entertainment of such Readers as delight not in philosophical and abstracted Speculations, I have added, to my Defence of the good and great Dr. Clarke, a literary Melange of History, News, Politics, Books, and learned Men, in a Letter from Mr. Leibnitz to a Gentleman, whose Son communicated to me that and other Letters from Mr. Leibnitz and Lock, which will be made Public by Mr. Burnet's Consent;

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sent; of whose Kindness I take this Opportunity to make a public Acknowledgment.

The Name of Thummig prefix'd to the first Paper is, I believe, fictitious; the real Author I take to be Mr. Wolf, so often mention'd in that Letter.

This Controversy was enter'd upon in Obedience to the Commands of her late Majesty Queen Caroline; who, in Dr. Clarke, chose the fittest Man in the World for defending the Principles of our great English Philosopher, the immortal NEWTON. Dr. Clarke had all the good Qualities of the best Christian, and the most learned Man: His Learning was universal, and his Behaviour innocent and mild; communicative and affable was his Temper; and his Name and Writings will be carried down to Posterity
with

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with Honour and Esteem, till all Remains of Learning be sunk into Oblivion, or Time itself be no more. How I have succeeded in my Defence of that great Man must be left to the Judgment of impartial Readers.

I have no Reason to detain the Reader by giving him a State of the Controversy between Dr. Clarke and Mr. Leibnitz; their Philosophical Letters are in the Hands of every one, who has any Regard for the Principles of natural Religion and Philosophy: And for such only are these Papers intended; not for Men who cannot be serious upon the most important Subjects, to whom Religious Truths and Liberty, or Agency, seem Matters of the greatest Indifference; and whose narrow Views of Happiness are confined to this World, and consist only in the Gratification of
Sensual

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Sensual Appetites. What Opinion such Men may have of this Performance, or its Author, is beneath the Notice of any Man engaged in the Support of Truth for the Sake of Truth, and not from Views of Interest, Prejudice or Party.

I shall add only one Observation more in this Place; that I have not confin'd myself to the Objections of Mr. Thummig, but endeavour'd to remove, in as few Words as possible, all the Difficulties which occur'd to me, and to place the Subjects I discourse upon, in a clear Light and natural Order.

A N
A N S W E R
T O
Dr. CLARKE's Fifth Reply,
B Y
Sieur LEWIS PHILIP THUMMIG,
In FAVOUR of
Mr. *L E I B N I T Z.*

R E P O N S E

Du Sieur LOUIS PHILIPPE THUM-
MIG, en Faveur du Baron de
LEIBNITZ, au Cinquieme Ecrit
du Dr. CLARKE.

I. **L** A Comparaison de la Balance est
mal expliquée ; la Resemblance n'est
pas entre la Balance et l'Esprit,
mais entre les poids et les motifs, comme il est
impossible que les poids mettent la balance en
mouvement lors qu'ils sont egaux ; et qu'il n'y
a aucune raison pourquoy un coté doit monter,
et l'autre descendre, de meme est il impossible
que les motifs excitent dans l'ame un penchant,
ou une Volonté, lors qu'ils sont d'un meme
poids, et qu'il n'y a point de raison pourquoy
l'un doit prevaloir plutôt que l'autre. C'est
donc en vain qu'on dit que la balance est pas-
sive, et que l'ame a le pouvoir d'agir, parce
qu'on ne cherche aucune ressemblance en cela ;
mais l'hypothese de la raison suffisante, comme
Mr. Leibnitz a deja remarqué, regarde indif-
ferement

An A N S W E R

*To Dr. CLARKE'S Fifth Reply, by
Sieur LEWIS PHILIP THUMMIG,
in Favour of Mr. LEIBNITZ.*

I. **T**H E Comparifon of the Balance is ill explained ; the Similitude is not between the Balance and the Mind, but between the Weights and the Motives ; for as it is impoffible that Weights ſhould ſet a Balance in Motion, when they are equal, and as no Reaſon can be given, why one Side ſhould riſe up, and the other go down ; it is alike impoffible, that Motives ſhould excite in the Soul an Inclination or Will, when they are of the ſame Weight, and no Reaſon can be given, why one ſhould prevail more than the other. It is then in vain to ſay, that the Balance is entirely paſſive, and that the Soul has the Power of Action, ſince we look for no Similitude between them ; but the Hypotheſis

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ferement les actions et les passions : On n'a donc aucune raison de rejeter une comparaison, qui est fort propre à éclaircir la chose, et par conséquent tout ce qu'on dit de l'ame tombe. On voit par là qu'on raisonne encore tres grossierement de l'ame, et qu'on se represent tout d'une maniere corporelle par l'Imagination; autrement on n'auroit jamais dit, que les motifs sont quelque chose d'externe qui fait impression sur l'Esprit, et qu'ils sont distingues du Principe d'action : Si l'on connoit un tel Principe distingué des motifs, il falloit le nommer pour savoir ce que c'est, mais en ne disant que le simple nom, on voit bien que c'est une chimere. Il seroit trop long d'expliquer clairement la difference des actions et des passions dans l'ame ; je remarque seulement qu'on a accoutumé d'appeller les representations imparfaites des sens et de l'imagination, des passions, et les representations claires dans l'entendement des actions, quand on examine les choses de pres on connoit aisement que dans les deux cas l'Esprit est actif : On ne doit donc pas dire que deux manieres differentes d'agir qui paroissent également bonne, ôtent à l'Esprit le pouvoir d'agir, comme les poids egaux empechent necessairement une balance de se mouvoir : Non.

L'Esprit

of sufficient Reason, as Mr. *Leibnitz* has already observed, indiscriminately regards both Actions and Passions: There is then no Reason for rejecting a Comparison so proper to clear up the Matter; and consequently all that is there said of the Soul falls to the Ground. There also we see how very grossly he reasons of the Soul, representing it entirely in a corporeal Manner by Imagination; otherwise he could never have said, that Motives have something extrinsic, which make an Impression on the Mind, and are distinguished from the Principle of Action: If he knew such a Principle distinguished from Motives, it was necessary to say what that Principle is, for by barely naming it, it would readily have been seen to have been but a Chimæra. It would be too long to explain clearly the Difference between Actions and Passions in the Soul; I here only observe, that we commonly call the imperfect Representations of the Senses, and of the Imagination, Passions; and the clear Representations of the Understanding, Actions: In both these Cases, if Things are nearly examin'd, we may easily know that the Mind is active; and it ought not then

L'Esprit s'abstient d'agir de ces deux manieres, parce qu'il n'a aucune raison d'agir d'une maniere plutot que de l'autre. Cependant si l'on veut parler des choses, comme elles se trouvent dans le Monde, et non comme on les suppose par des abstractions dans nos idées, un tel cas ne se presentera jamais, ou il n'y ait aucune raison qui determine pour une maniere d'agir plutot que pour l'autre. Si donc on a de bonnes raisons de ne pas s'abstenir entierement d'agir, on trouvera toujours aussi une raison qui determine pour un maniere d'agir. L'Experience le fait voir, et on peut le demontrer ; mais comme la demonstration penetre trop avant dans la connoissance des choses contingentes, il est a craindre, qu'on ne pourrois pas la comprendre à present, puis qu'on ne connoit pas assez de choses plus faciles. Ces memes Argumens font voir qu'il est absolument impossible, qu'il y ait dans le Monde deux particules de matiere parfaitement semblables, et par consequent que la question si Dieu les peut creer telles, est inutile. Ceux, qui s'imaginent de telles choses, ont des idées fort bornées de l'Etat de Monde. Il ne voyent pas que dans le Monde toutes choses sont liees ensemble selon le lieu et le tems, et quelles sont
les

to be said, that an equal, apparent Goodness, in two different Ways of acting, takes away from the Mind all Power of acting at all, as an Equality of Weights keeps a Balance necessarily at rest : No. By these two Ways the Mind is kept from acting in as much as there is no Reason for one Way of acting more than another. Yet if one would speak of Things as they really are in the World, and not as they are imagined by abstract Ideas, such a Case will never be met with, where there will be no Reason to determine one Way of acting more than another. If then there are good Reasons, not entirely to abstain from acting at all, we shall always find some Reason to determine the Manner of acting. Experience shews it, and it may be demonstrated ; but as Demonstration penetrates too far into the Knowledge of contingent Things, it is to be feared, whether at present they might be comprehended, since this Author is at a Loss to conceive many Things still more easy. These Arguments also shew, that it is absolutely impossible for two Particles of Matter in the Universe to be exactly alike ; and consequently the Question, if God can

les suites de ces liaisons. Ce qu'on dit de la nécessité hypothetique et morale, sont des mots, et non des choses ; quand l'usage a autorisé des mots, il n'y a aucune raison de les changer, soit que selon les regles de la Grammaire ils soient exacts ou non ; pourvu qu'on les explique, ils ne sçauroient porter prejudice a la verité. Mr. Leibnitz ne se contredit pas, non plus, quand il avance que la Volonte ne suit pas toujours exactement l'Entendement Pratique, parce qu'elle peut trouver quelquefois des raisons pour suspendre sa Resolution. Dans ce cas les motifs ne sont pas parfaits, et le dernier jugement de l'Entendement Pratique, ne se trouve pas encore.

2. *Quand on dit qu'il falloit prouver qu'il est impossible que Dieu crée deux portions de matiere parfaitement semblables, il faut remarquer que cette prouve est facile, & que Mr. Wolf dans ses Pensées de Dieu, du Monde,*

create such, is unnecessary. They, who give into such Imaginations, must have very limited Ideas of the State of the Universe. They do not perceive how all Things in the Universe are connected together according to Time and Place, and what are the necessary Productions of these Connections. What is advanced about Hypothetical and Moral Necessity are Words, and not Things: When Custom has authorized Words, there is no Reason to change them, should they, or should they not be entirely conformable to the Rules of Grammar; provided they are explained, they cannot be prejudicial to the Truth. Nor does Mr. *Leibnitz* contradict himself, when he says, that the Will does not always precisely follow the practical Understanding, because it may sometimes find Reasons to suspend its Resolutions. In this Case the Motives are not perfect, and the last Judgment of the practical Understanding is not yet found.

2. When this Author calls for Proof, that it is impossible for God to create two Portions of Matter perfectly alike, let me observe, that this is easy to be done, and that Mr. *Wolf* in his Thoughts on God, the Universe,

Monde, et de l'Ame de l'Homme, Chap. IV.
 §. 587. l'a prouvé en effet, de la maniere qu'on le demande par la nature du Monde sans avoir egard a la sagesse de Dieu. On ne voit donc pas ce qu'on y peut repliquer encore, et on devoit avoüer qu'on a satisfait entierement à cet egard. Tout ce qu'on allegue, etant fondé sur l'opinion qu'el est impossible de prouver par la nature du Monde, qu'il n'y puisse avoir deux choses parfaitement semblables, tombe de lui meme, et il n'est pas necessaire qu'on y reponde.

3. On s'imagine qu'on se contredit, quand on reconnoit, que deux choses tout à fait semblables seroient veritablement deux choses, et que non obstant cet aveu on continue de dire qu'elles n'auroient pas le Principe d'Individuation, et qu'on assure meme qu'elles ne seroient qu'une meme chose sous deux noms ; mais la preuve deja alleguée de l'impossibilité de deux choses parfaitement semblables dans le Monde, fait voir que ces suppositions ne se detruisent pas. Quand on se represente par abstraction deux choses semblables, elles sont deux, et non une meme chose ; mais quand on les considere comme des choses reeles, on trouve par la nature des contingens, que ce n'est qu'une meme chose

Universe, and the Soul of Man. Chap. IV, § 587. has in Effect proved it, in the Manner requir'd, from the Nature of the Universe, without Relation to the Wisdom of God. To this then no other Reply seems necessary, and he ought to acknowledge it as satisfactory on this Article: All he alleges being founded on the Opinion, that it is impossible to prove by the Nature of the Universe, that there can be two Things exactly alike, falls of itself, and needs no Answer.

3. This Author imagines there is a Self-Contradiction in asserting, that two Things exactly alike would really be two, and yet that they would want the Principle of Individuation, and be only the same Thing under two Names; but the Proof already brought of the Impossibility of two Things being exactly alike in the Universe, shews, that these Suppositions do not destroy themselves. When two Things resembling one another are represented by Abstraction, they are two, and not the same Thing; but when they are consider'd as real Things, it is evident from the Nature of Contingencies that they are the same Thing under two Names,
and

chose sous deux noms, et qu'on ne peut se les représenter comme deux que lors qu'on en sépare dans ses Idées, le Principe d'Individuation. On appelle Principe d'Individuation, ce qui détermine une chose en elle-même, et hors d'elle, c. a. d. dans son essence, et dans sa réalité; mais les choses contingentes sont déterminées par une liaison infinie avec les autres choses du Monde, tant à l'égard du Space que du tems. Quand donc deux choses dans un Monde sont semblables, le Principe d'Individuation doit être le même; je dis dans un Monde, car je ne nie pas que dans de différens Mondes, il n'y puisse avoir deux choses semblables, mais alors elles n'ont pas le même Principe d'Individuation. Il en est de même de ce qu'on a dit des parties du tems et de l'espace. Quand on reconnoît que les parties du tems et de l'espace se ressemblent parfaitement, on considère le tems et l'espace in abstracto; mais quand on nie que le tems et l'espace se ressemblent lors qu'il y a des Corps dans ces parties, on les considère in concreto, entant qu'ils sont quelque chose de réel. Ce n'est donc pas une véritable contradiction, qui demande, comme tout le monde sçait, que dans les deux propositions

on

and cannot be represented as two, but when separated in our Ideas, the Principle of Individuation. We call the Principle of Individuation, that which determines a Thing in itself, and without itself, *i. e.* in its Essence and in its Reality; but contingent Things are determined by an infinite Connection with other Things in the Universe, as well with Respect to Space as Time. When two Things then in one World are alike, the Principle of Individuation must be the same; I say in one World, because I do not deny, but that in different Worlds two Things may be alike; but then they have not the same Principle of Individuation. It is the same with this, that is said of the Parts of Time and Space. When we allow that the Parts of Time and Space are uniform, or alike, we consider Time and Space *in abstracto*; but when we deny that Time and Space are alike, when there are Bodies in them, we consider them *in concreto*, in as much as they are something real. It is not then any real Contradiction which requires (as all the World knows) that in two Propositions we consider Things in the same View; one cannot but be the more surprized,

on considere les choses sous la meme face; on doit etre d'autant plus surpris, qu'on cherche ici des contradictions que Mr. Leibnitz s'est expliqué assez clairement sur ce sujet. Il ne seroit pas difficile de faire voir, que les autres contradictions qu'on trouve ne sont qu'apparentes, et viennent de ce qu'on entend mal les choses; mais on seroit trop long, et il ne paroît pas necessaire de le faire, parce qu'on n'a d'autre vûe dans cet Ecrit, que de faire voir, qu'il est facile de repondre à ce que Mr. Clark replique, quoique ceux qui n'ont pas approfondi les verites Metaphysiques puissent en etre frappé.

4. *Pour refuter solidement ce qu'on avance que la Resistance ne vient pas de la quantité de la matiere, mais de la difficulté qu'elle a à ceder, il auroit fallu, ou prouver l'opinion commune que la quantité de la matiere cause la resistance, ou donner des argumens pour faire voir, qu'elle ne peut venir de la difficulté de ceder, comme on n'a fait ni l'un ni l'autre, on voit qu'on n'a examiné que fort legerement les choses.*

5. *Sur ce qu'on continue de soutenir que l'espace est un attribut de Dieu, on ne se propose pas*

prized, that Contradictions should be here imagined, as Mr. *Leibnitz* is sufficiently clear on this Subject. It would not be difficult to shew, that the other Contradictions are only apparent ones, and proceed from a wrong Judgment of Things; but that would be too long here, and seem altogether unnecessary, by Reason we have no other View in this Paper than to shew, that it is *easy* to answer Dr. *Clark's* Reply; however those, who are little grounded in metaphysical Truths, may be struck with it.

4. To confute substantially that Position, "that Resistance does not arise from the Quantity of Matter, but from its Difficulty of giving Place,"---He should either have proved the common Opinion, that the Quantity of Matter does cause Resistance, or have brought Arguments to shew, that it cannot arise from its Difficulty of giving Place; neither of which being done, it is plain he has examined Things very superficially.

5. As to this Author's continuing to assert that Space is an Attribute of God, it is

pas de defendre au long les consequences que Mr. Leibnitz tire contre cet opinion, et que Mr. Clark nie ; mais on adopte la definition qu'il en donne, seulement on laisse a juger, si l'espace qui a des parties peut etre un attribut de Dieu qui est un etre simple. Car de ce qu'on dit que ces parties sont inseparables et immobiles, il ne s'ensuit pas que l'espace est un etre simple ; ce n'est pas la separabilite et la mobilite, mais la presence des parties qui fait qu'un etre est composé, et non pas simple. Car ce qui distingue un etre simple d'un etre composé c'est qu'il n'a point de parties. Un etre qui a des parties inseparables et immobiles, dont aucune n'est distinguée de l'autre que par le nombre, n'est pas un etre simple, mais un composé similaire ; et de tels composés similaires, sont selon le Principe des Indiscernables qu'on a déjà prouvé des monstres de l'Imagination, qui ne se trouvent point dans la nature, et que l'Entendement ne peut concevoir. D'ailleurs il ne suffit pas de dire que l'espace est un attribut de Dieu, puis qu'on le nie ; il auroit fallu le prouver. On tache d'en donner une preuve dans la remarque qu'on a ajouté sous c. mais on y suppose bien des choses dont on

is not my Purpose to make a long Defence of the Consequences which Mr. *Leibnitz* draws from this Opinion, and which Dr. *Clark* denies; but I'll admit his Definition of it, only leaving it to be judged, whether Space, which has Parts, can be an Attribute of God, who is a Simple Being. For tho' he alledges that these Parts are inseparable and immoveable, it does not follow that Space is a Simple Being: It is not the Separability or Mobility, but the Presence of Parts, that makes a Being compound, and not simple, for what distinguishes a simple Being from a compound is its having no Parts. A Being having Parts inseparable and immoveable, not distinguishable from each other but by Number, is not a simple Being, but a similar Compound; and such similar Compounds are (according to the Principle of Indiscernables, which has already been proved) Monsters of the Imagination not to be met with in Nature, nor conceivable to the Understanding. Besides, it is not sufficient merely to say that Space is an Attribute of God, since that has been deny'd, it should be proved. A Proof is indeed endeavoured at in his Remark

ne peut convenir. Nous nous contenterons d'en alleguer quelques unes. Quand on soutient par exemple que l'espace n'est pas une pure idée, on veut le prouver par ce que la raison nous enseigne que l'espace est actuellement infini, et nos idées ne peuvent qu'être finies, on confond ici l'infini imaginaire, avec l'infini reel. Il est constant, que nos idées, c'est à dire une chose de pure imagination, ne sçauroient être actuellement infinies, mais elles peuvent aller à l'infini imaginaire, car ce dernier infini n'est qu'une maniere de parler, dont les Mathematiciens se servent, lors qu'il s'agit d'un objet imaginaire, comme Mr. Leibnitz l'a remarqué dans les *Actes de Leipfig*. Il en est tout autrement de l'infini actuel qui appartient à la *Metaphysique*, et dont Mr. Wolf a donné le premier une idée claire, dans ses *Pensées de Dieu, du Monde, et de l'Ame de l'Homme*. Comme donc Mr. Clark ne parle que de l'Infini des Mathematiciens, on nie qu'une pure idée ne puisse aller au delà du fini : L'Espace étant une chose imaginaire, un infini imaginaire lui convient très bien. Pour mieux concevoir la raison pourquoy on ne peut mettre des bornes à l'espace, il faut remarquer qu'on le considère en abstrait, et que par conséquent il n'a aucun Principe d'Individuation

added at the Bottom, but many Things are there supposed, by no Means to be agreed to. We will content ourselves with producing only some of them. When, for Example, any one affirms, that Space is not a mere Idea, he will prove it by what Reason teaches us, that Space is actually infinite, and that our Ideas cannot but be finite: Here he confounds the imaginary Infinite with the real Infinite. It is certain, that our Ideas, *i. e.* a Thing of mere Imagination, cannot be actually Infinite, but they may extend to the imaginary Infinite, for this last Infinite is only a Way of Expression made use of by Mathematicians, when it concerns an imaginary Object, as Mr. *Leibnitz* has remark'd in the *Actes de Leipsig*. It is quite otherwise with Respect to the real Infinite (which belongs to Metaphysics) of which Mr. *Wolf* has given the first clear Idea in his Thoughts on God, the World, and the Soul of Man. As Dr. *Clarke* speaks only of the Mathematical Infinite, I deny, that a mere Idea can extend beyond what is finite: Space being an imaginary Thing, an imaginary Infinite is very suitable with it. The better to conceive the Reason why Space can-

*d'Individuation qui puisse le borner, tout ainsi que la matiere en abstrait n'a point de bornes. On ne prouve pas non plus que l'espace n'est point l'ordre, parce que l'ordre ne peut avoir une quantité: On peut prouver le contraire, ce qu'en tira au long. Quoiqu'on reconnoisse encore que l'espace n'est pas la matiere meme, on ne convient pas que cela resulte des raisons qu'on en allegue. Enfin on convient, et les Theologiens ont remarqué il y a long temps, que Dieu n'existe point dans l'espace, (quoique dans un sens different de celui de Mr. Clark.) Cependant si l'on soutient que l'espace est un attribut de Dieu, on ne sçauroit nier, que l'espace existe en Dieu, et l'on tombe par là dans l'absurde dont on a deja parlé, sçavoir, que dans un etre simple qui n'a point de partie, existe ce qui a des parties, actuellement existentes hors les unes des autres, et distinguées les unes des autres, quoiqu'elles se ressemblent parfaitement. Il paroît de tout cela qu'on est encore fort esclave de l'imagination, et qu'au lieu de se former des idées pures par des principes clairs de la raison, (tels que sont le principe de la contradiction, et celui de la raison suffisante, qui ont tant servi à mettre dans leur jour les verites Metaphysiques) ; et
par*

not be bounded, it must be observed, that it is consider'd in abstract, and that consequently there is no Principle of Individuation, which can bound it, directly the same as Matter in Abstract has no Bounds. Neither is it proved, that Space is not Order, because Order has not Quantity; the contrary can be proved, which is shewn at large. Though it should be here acknowledg'd, that Space is not Matter, yet it will not be granted as a Consequence from the Reasons this Author brings for it. In short it is granted, and the Divines have long since observed, that God does not exist in Space; (tho' in a different Sense from Dr. *Clark's*). Yet if one were to affirm, that Space is an Attribute of God, it cannot be denied, but that Space exists in God; and thereupon arises the Absurdity already mentioned, *viz.* that in a simple Being which has no Parts, there exists that which has Parts actually existing without each other, and distinguished from each other, tho' they are exactly alike. Hence appears what a Slave he is to Imagination, and that instead of forming to himself pure Ideas from clear Principles of Reason (such as the Principle of Contradiction, and that

par des consequences legitimes, on se contente d'images, comme Lock a fait dans son livre de l'Entendement Humain, ce qui etoit cause qu'il n'a jamais approfondi les matieres. Il ne faut donc pas etre surpris, si Mr. Clark n'entend jamais Mr. Leibnitz ; et si, au lieu de lui repondre, il dit simplement ce qui resulte de ses idées : Cependant comme on a montré au long, de quelle maniere on doit se former l'idée de l'espace, on n'auroit pas du passer sous Silence, si l'on avoit eu quelque chose de bon à dire pour refuter ce Sentiment.

6. *Ce qu'on dit que le monde entier pourroit etre transposé de sa place, est une Supposition à plaisir, qu'on avance sans preuves : On n'a tort de demander qu'on prouve le contraire, c'est à celui qui affirme une chose à la prouver. Cependant Mr. Leibnitz a fait voir suffisamment, que le monde entier ne sçauroit etre transporté de sa place, parce que ce mouvement ne produiroit aucun changement, et ne seroit par consequent fondé sur aucune raison. On n'en veut pas convenir. Cependant*
la

of sufficient Reason, which have been so serviceable to the setting Metaphysical Truths in their proper Light) and from just Consequences, he contents himself with Images, as *Lock* has done in his Essay on human Understanding, which was the Cause of his not going to the Bottom of Things. It must not then be Matter of Surprize, if Dr. *Clarke* does not always understand Mr. *Leibnitz*, and if, instead of answering, he says only what is the Result of his Ideas: Yet as it is largely shewn in what Manner we should form an Idea of Space, if any Thing good could be brought to confute this Opinion, it should not have been passed over in Silence.

6. This Author's saying, that the material World might be moved from its Place, is a Supposition at Pleasure advanced without any Proof: One has a Right to require a Proof to the contrary, since it is the Part of him who advances to prove his Assertion. However Mr. *Leibnitz* has sufficiently shewn, that the material World cannot be moved from its Place, because this Motion would produce no Change, and consequently could not be founded on any Reason.

la chose est facile à concevoir, comme il n'arriveroit aucun changement à une boule, si on la transportoit d'un lieu à un autre, de meme il n'arriveroit aucun changement à un monde bornée, s'il étoit transporté dans un autre lieu, parce que toutes les parties conserveroient le meme situation respective, qu'elles avoient auparavant ; et que par consequent on n'y remarqueroit autre chose, que ce qu'on auroit remarqué, si elles avoient demeuré toujours dans le meme lieu. L'Exemple d'une montre peut éclaircir la chose. En transportant une montre d'un lieu à un autre on n'y cause aucun changement ; la variété de la situation de l'aiguille, et de la position respective des roües, vient du mouvement interieur des parties. Il est hors de propos de dire, que par ce mouvement les parties recevroient un plus grand choc ; ce n'est pas là de quoi il s'agit : On insiste seulement, que ce mouvement du tout ne produiroit aucun changement qu'on pourroit remarquer ensuite, ce que l'exemple d'une montre fait voir. Il ne faut pas pousser cette comparaison trop loin, et au delà des justes bornes. Une montre se meut dans une espace rempli d'autres corps, et son mouvement produit un changement, qu'on peut remarquer
quand

Reason. This will not be granted. Yet it is easy to imagine, that as a Ball would undergo no Change by being moved from one Place to another, no more would a finite World suffer any Change by being moved to another Place, because all the Parts would preserve the same respective Situation they had before, and consequently there could be observed nothing but what had been observed, if it had still remained in the same Place. The Example of a Watch may clear up the Matter. The conveying a Watch from one Place to another causes no Change in it ; the Difference of the Situation of the Hand, and the respective Position of the Wheels, are caused by the interior Motion of the Parts. It is out of the Question to say, that by this Motion the Parts would receive a greater Shock ; that is not to our Purpose : We only insist, that the Motion of the whole would produce no discoverable Change, which the Example of the Watch shews. The Comparison must not be carry'd too far, and beyond just Bounds. A Watch moves in a Space occupy'd by other Bodies, and its Motion produces a Change that can be observed
when

quand le mouvement a cessé. Quand au contraire on suppose que le monde se meut dans un espace vuide, on ne remarquera rien lors que le mouvement aura cessé, et ce sera la meme chose que s'il avoit toujours demeuré dans la meme place. On ne nie pas que le monde pendant qu'il est en mouvement, ne differe par ce mouvement d'un monde qui est en repos; mais on soutient seulement, qu'apres le mouvement, on ne remarqueroit rien, qu'on n'eut remarqué, si ce mouvement n'etoit arrivé. C'est a cause de cela qu'on le nomme un mouvement à plaisir, qui est contraire au principe de la raison suffisante. On demande donc sans raison de repondre à l'objection du changement, causé par le mouvement, ce qui n'est pas de ce lieu.

7. On auroit de montrer que de la difference du mouvement absolu et relatif, il s'ensuit necessairement, que l'espace est entierement different de la situation, et de l'ordre des corps, parce que chacun ne tombera pas d'accord de cette consequence.

8. On auroit pu facilement concevoir, que l'espace, pris meme pour l'ordre des corps situés les uns aupres des autres, peut avoir une quantité, si l'on avoit fait attention à ce
que

when the Motion has ceased. When on the contrary it is supposed, that the World moves in a void Space, there will be no Alteration observed when the Motion shall cease, and it will be exactly the same, as if it had remained in the same Place. It is not deny'd, but that the World, while it is in Motion, differs from a World at rest; it is only asserted, that after the Motion, nothing will be observed, but would have been observed, had not that Motion happened. It is for this reason, I call it a Motion at Pleasure, which is contrary to the Principle of *sufficient Reason*. It is then unreasonable to require an Answer to the Objection of the Change, caused by the Motion, which does not belong to this Place.

7. Here he should have shewn, how the Difference between absolute Motion, and relative Motion, does necessarily infer, that Space is quite different from the Situation or Order of Bodies, since every one will not fall in with that Inference.

8. It were easy to conceive, that Space even taken for the Order of Bodies situated near one another, may have a Quantity, if he had given Attention to what Mr. *Leib-*
nitz

que Mr. Leibnitz dit, que dans l'ordre, il y a quelque chose qui precede, et quelque chose qui suit. Aussi tot qu'on a des choses differentes, dont l'une est hors de l'autre, et qui ensemble font un tout, on a un nombre de parties; et peut on douter, qu'un nombre de parties ne soit une quantité. Il n'est donc pas necessaire d'examiner au long jusqu'ou, en Mathematiques, on peut attribuer aux Proportions, qui comme l'ordre ne sont que des relations, une quantité, et appeller les Logarithmes la mesure de cette quantité. C'est d'autant moins necessaire, que Mr. Leibnitz a pu s'en servir comme d'un argument ad hominem. De grands Mathematiciens ont donné aux proportions une quantité, comme Gregoire à St. Vincent, et parmi les Anglois, Wallis, qui Vol. 1. Oper. Math. Fol. 154. dit expressement, les proportions ne sont pas moins que les nombres de veritables quantites. Quand on sçait la maniere de disputer de Mr. Leibnitz, on ne peut ignorer qu'il se servoit souvent de ces argumens ad hominem. Ceux, qui ne l'observent pas, et qui croient que tout ce qu'il dit, quand il dispute contre les autres de cette maniere est son veritable sentiment, l'accuseront

Leibnitz says, that in Order, there is that which goes before, and that which follows. As soon as we have Things different from each other, one of which is distinct from the other, yet together constituting a whole, we have a Number of Parts; and can it be doubted, but that a Number of Parts do constitute a Quantity. It is not then necessary to enquire at large, how far in Mathematicks we may attribute to Proportions (which, as well as Order, are only Relations) a Quantity, and call Logarithms the Measure of that Quantity. It is the more unnecessary, as Mr. *Leibnitz* might have made use of this as an Argument *ad hominem*. Great Mathematicians have given Proportions a Quantity, as *Gregory à St. Vincent*, and among the *English*, *Wallis*, who in his *Oper. Math.* Vol. 1. Fol. 154. says expressly, Proportions are not less than the Numbers of true Quantities. When one is acquainted with Mr. *Leibnitz*'s Manner of disputing, one cannot be ignorant of his often making use of these Arguments *ad hominem*. Those, who do not observe this, and who believe all he says, when he disputes after this Manner, to be his true Sentiment,

l'accuseront facilement de contradictions. On doit sans doute mettre dans ce rang les contradictions, que Mr. Clark relève, quoiqu'il en trouve souvent parce qu'il ne l'entend pas, et lors que les choses ne sont nullement incompatibles. Mettons dans ce dernier range ce qu'il dit sur la Question, si Dieu auroit pu créer l'univers plutôt, ou plus tard? Ceux, qui lisent les passages cités, dans Leibnitz meme, ne trouveront pas qu'il soit convenu que l'univers auroit pu être créé plutôt qu'il ne l'a été, mais seulement que dans l'Imagination on pourroit le supposer. Aussi a-t'il comparé ce monde créé plutôt à une tête, à laquelle le peintre a ajouté un col de cheval, pour faire voir que ce n'est pas tant une chose, qui tombe dans nos idées qu'une supposition impossible.

9. *Quand on convient, que Dieu peut donner des bornes à la matiere, et la rendre finie, on ne convient pas par là qu'elle peut être mobile. Cette supposition est appelée dans le 5 Ecrit une Chimere, qui choque la raison. Puisque donc on conclut, que l'espace est indépendant de la matiere, non parce que le monde est borné, mais parce qu'il est mobile;*
cette

Sentiment, will readily charge him with Contradictions. Among this Number should, without Doubt, be rank'd the Contradictions, which Dr. *Clarke* raises up against him, tho' he often spies some thro' Want of understanding him, and when the Things are no Ways inconsistent. Among this Number let us rank what he says on the Question; whether God could have created the Universe sooner or later? They, who read the Passages in Mr. *Leibnitz*, will not find that he does agree that the World could have been created sooner than it actually was, but only that in Imagination one might suppose it: And even there he compares such an Universe to a Head, to which the Painter has added a Horse's Neck, thereby intimating, that such a Thing, far from falling under our Ideas, is an impossible Supposition.

9. When it is granted, that God can set Bounds to Matter, and render it finite, it is not granted, that from thence it is moveable. This Supposition is called in the fifth Paper, a Chimera contrary to Reason. Since it then concludes, that Space is independent upon Matter, not from the Universe being finite, but from its being moveable;

cette conclusion ne fait rien contre Mr. Leibnitz. Au reste, quand meme le monde seroit necessairement eternal, c. a. d. qu'il n'eut point eu de commencement, mais qu'il eut existé toujours, il ne dependroit pas de Dieu par rapport à son commencement (qui seroit un pur neant) mais il dependroit de sa libre volonté quant à son existence, puis qu'il auroit existé actuellement, preferablement à tant d'autres mondes, également possibles, parce que Dieu par sa sagesse l'auroit choisi.

10. Il falloit prouver, et non seulement dire, que l'existence de Dieu est la cause de l'espace, on voit bien, pourquoy on ne l'a pas fait, parce qu'il n'y a aucune liaison entre l'espace qu'on imagine, et l'idée de l'Essence et de l'Existence de Dieu. On seroit curieux d'entendre comment par l'idée de Dieu, et de ses Attributs, on peut prouver, qu'il y a en lui un espace infini et vuide, c'est à dire, une chose etendue à l'infini, dont toutes les parties se ressembleroit parfaitement, parce qu'elles n'ont rien de reel.

11. On convient asses, et Mr. Clark l'avoüe lui meme que ni lui, ni plusieurs autres

moveable ; this Conclusion makes nothing against Mr. *Leibnitz*. Moreover, even should the World be necessarily eternal, *i. e.* not having a Beginning, but existing from all Eternity, it would not indeed be dependent upon God with Respect to its Beginning, (which, in this Case, would be a mere nothing) but it would depend upon his free Will, as to its Existence, since it would actually exist preferably to so many other Worlds equally possible, because God in his Wisdom would have made Choice of it.

10. It should have been proved, not barely asserted, that the Existence of God causes Space. It is easy to be perceived why it has not been done, it is because there is no Connection between the Space imagined, and the Idea of the Essence and Existence of God. I should be glad to learn how from the Idea of God, and his Attributes, it can be proved, that in him exists infinite and void Space, that is to say, a Thing extended *in infinitum*, all the Parts of which are exactly alike, because they have nothing real in them.

11. We readily grant, and Dr. *Clarke* himself acknowledges it, that neither he,

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nor

autres de ses Compatriotes n'entendent pas ce que Mr. Leibnitz veut dire, quand il attribue à l'ame un Principe representatif. Cependant la chose est intelligible, et on peut expliquer par la d'une maniere claire les operations les plus abstruses de l'ame, comme Mr. Wolf l'a fait dans sa Metaphysique: On n'auroit rien à dire non plus contre l'Harmonie preetablie, si on l'entendoit, et qui faute de penetration on ne la prit, pour un mot qui n'a aucune signification, comme on le peut voir dans le livre cité.

12. Il est surprenant qu'on demande des preuves, pourquoy l'on croit une these unintelligible. C'est à celui qui la croit intelligible à le faire voir. Si Mr. Clark croit intelligible, que les images des choses sont portées par les organes des sens, dans le sensorium, ou l'ame les apperçoit, qu'il fasse voir de quelle maniere cela se fait. Sans cela, on ne peut pas dire, que sa These est intelligible. Pour qu'une chose soit intelligible, il faut pouvoir expliquer de quelle maniere elle est possible. On voit ici une nouvelle preuve, combien peu on a avancé dans l'Etude de Platon, de faire abstraction des sens, et de l'imagination dans la perception des choses,

nor any of his Countrymen, understand what Mr. *Leibnitz* means, when he gives to the Soul a representative Faculty. Yet it is very intelligible, and by that Principle the most abstruse Operations of the Soul may be explained in a clear Manner, as Mr. *Wolf* has done in his *Metaphysique*. As little would have been said against the *præ-established Harmony*, if it had been understood; and for Want of Penetration it is taken for a Word signifying nothing, as is shewn in the Book just cited.

12. It is surprizing, that this Author should require Proofs, why a Position is look'd upon as unintelligible. It is the Part of him who believes it intelligible to make it appear. If Dr. *Clark* believes it intelligible, that the Images of Things are convey'd by the Organs of Sense into the Sensory, where the Soul perceives them, let him shew in what Manner they are convey'd, without which it cannot be said, that his Position is intelligible. To make a Thing intelligible it should be explained in what Manner it is possible. Here is a new Proof, how little Progress is made in the Study of *Plato*, in making Abstraction of

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ce qui pourtant est une des principales qualités d'un *Metaphysicien*. On appelle le sentiment qui soutient que Dieu connoit toutes choses parce qu'il les produit continuellement de nouveau, une pure *fiCTION des Scholastiques* ; quoiqu'on conçoive tres bien de cette maniere, comment Dieu connoit les choses presentes. On dit au contraire, que Dieu apperçoit toutes choses par sa presence *actuelle* ; et cependant on ne veut pas convenir que les choses créées agissent sur le *Createur*, parce qu'il s'ensuivroit de là, qu'il dependroit de la creature, et seroit en effet l'ame du monde. Ainsi on dit en plusieurs manieres des choses inintelligibles.

13. Ce qu'on dit du mouvement des Corps, sans l'influence des ames, ne prouve pas une *nécessité irresistible* ; et moins encore un aveugle destin, ni n'enerve les argumens, qui prouvent l'immortalité de l'ame. On n'a qu'à connoître ce que c'est que *Nécessité, Contingence, Liberté, Pensée, &c.* et les ecailles tomberont des yeux.

14. Ce qu'on allegue contre le Systeme des Forces actives, vient de ce qu'on n'entend pas encore les *Principes Dynamiques*, tant parce
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the Senses and Imagination in the Perception of Things, which however is one of the principal Qualities of a Metaphysician. The Opinion that God knows all Things by continually producing them anew, is called a mere Fiction of the Schoolmen, tho' from this Manner it is very conceivable how God knows Things present. On the contrary, he says, that God knows all Things by his actual Presence, and yet he will not grant, that created Things act upon the Creator, because it would thence follow, that he would be dependent upon the Creature, and would in Effect be the Soul of the World. Thus do Men speak unintelligible Things in many different Manners.

13. What has been said of the Motion of Bodies, without the Influence of the Soul does not prove an irresistible Necessity, and much less a blind Fate, nor weakens the Arguments which prove the Immortality of the Soul. We have *only* to know what Necessity, Contingency, Liberty, Thought, &c. are, and the Film will drop from the Sight.

14. What he alledges against the System of active Forces proceeds from his not understanding Dynamic Principles, as well be-

que Mr. Leibnitz étoit réservé là dessus, et n'a pas mis au jour les argumens qui les prouvent et expliquent, que parce que d'autres qui les ont voulu prouver, sont tombé dans des Contradictions. Comme ce n'est pas le lieu ici de traiter à fonds cette matiere, on la renvoye jusqu'à ce que quelque homme habile mette ces Principes Dynamiques dans un plus grand jour, qu'on n'a fait jusqu'ici. Quant au Professeur Herman, il a répondu aux Accusations de Mr. Clark, dans ses Exercitations Francofurtens ; et plus particulièrement dans une Dissertation Academique.

15. Pour refuter la definition des miracles, qu'on a emprunté avec Lock de Spinoze, on a allegué avec raison, qu'il faudroit aussi regarder les monstres comme des miracles, parce qu'ils arrivent rarement, en comparaison des autres choses. On n'y a point répondu, sans doute, parce qu'on n'y a pu répondre ; la Conséquence est trop claire, pour qu'on puisse la contester. Cependant chacun regarderoit comme absurde cette opinion, que les monstres sont des miracles. On pourroit alleguer plusieurs autres exemples pour faire voir, qu'on prend le mot de miracle dans un sens fort impropre, quand on l'explique par ce qui arrive rarement ;

cause Mr. *Leibnitz* was reserved on that Subject, and did not produce the Arguments which prove and explain them, as that others, who have attempted to prove them, are fallen into Contradictions. But as this is not the Place to treat this Matter to the Bottom, I refer it till some able Person shall set this Doctrine in a fairer Light than has hitherto been done. As to Professor *Her-*
man, he has answer'd Dr. *Clarke's* Accusa-
tions, in his *Franckfort Exercitations*, and more particularly in an academic Differta-
tion.

15. To confute the Definition of Mira-
cles, which this Author, as well as *Lock*
has borrow'd from *Spinoza*, it was very
justly alleged, that we might also look
upon Monsters as Miracles, because of their
Unusualness in Comparison of other Things.
To this he has given no Answer; without
Doubt, because he had none to give: That
Consequence is too obvious to be contested.
However absurd every one would look upon
the Opinion, that Monsters are Miracles,
we might bring many other Examples to
shew, that he takes the Word Miracle in a
very improper Sense, when he explains it

ment. Il arrive rarement, qu'une femme accouche de trois Enfans ; cependant personne ne diroit que c'est un miracle lors que cela arriveroit. Il arrive rarement, que les œufs de Grenouille se glacent en Printems, et qu'étant ensuite pourris, ils donnent a l'Eau une Couleur rouge. Cependant il n'y a que le commun peuple, qui regarde cela comme un miracle ; non parce que la chose arrive rarement, mais parce qu'il croit, que l'Eau s'est convertie en Sang d'une maniere surnaturelle, comme autrefois en Egypte. Les Exemples que Mr. Clark allegue ne prouvent nullement, qu'un miracle consiste en ce qu'une chose arrive rarement : On peut les alleguer aussi bien pour prouver la definition ordinaire d'un miracle. Quand un Corps humain reduit en poudre est resuscité, on appelle cela un miracle, non parce que la chose arrive rarement, mais parce qu'on croit qu'elle surpasse les forces de la nature. On appelle par la meme raison miracle, si le Soleil ou la Terre sont arretes. Avant qu'on sçut que les Eclipses du Soleil arrivoient par des Causes naturelles, on les regardoit comme des miracles ; mais des qu'on connut qu'elles arrivoient naturellement, on ne les prit plus pour des miracles. Venus
 passe

by that which rarely happens. It rarely happens that a Woman is delivered of three Children at a Birth ; yet, when it does happen, no one would call it a Miracle. It rarely happens, that the Eggs of Frogs freeze in the Spring, and that afterwards growing rotten, they tinge the Water with a red Colour. Nevertheless none, but the common People, look upon that as a Miracle ; not because it is unusual, but because they believe the Water to be turn'd to Blood by supernatural Means, as formerly in *Egypt*. The Examples Dr. *Clarke* brings, no Ways prove, that a Miracle consists in the Unusualness of a Thing ; they might as well be brought to prove the common Definition of a Miracle. The raising a human Body reduced to Dust is called a Miracle, not because such a Thing seldom happens, but because we believe it surpasses the Powers of Nature. For the same Reason we should call it a Miracle, were the Sun and the Earth to stand still. Before it was known that Eclipses of the Sun happened from natural Causes, they were look'd upon as Miracles, but when it was known that they proceeded from the Course
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passé rarement par le Disque du Soleil, cependant personne ne s'est avisé de croire que c'est un miracle. Spinoze, qui croyoit que tout arrive naturellement avoit raison de dire, que les miracles sont des Evenemens rares ; car si tout ce qui arrive dans le monde est produit par des causes naturelles, les miracles ne peuvent être autre chose. Si Lock n'étoit pas du Sentiment de Spinoze, il a eu tort d'adopter son Idée, puisqu'il nie, les Premisses, et admet la Conclusion ; et Mr. Clark, qui admet des Actions immédiates de Dieu dans le monde, n'a pas mieux fait, en l'adoptant. Quand il s'agit du sens d'un mot dans l'usage ordinaire, dont on ne doit pas s'écarter sans nécessité, il faut consulter les Expressions ordinaires, ce qu'on blâme sans fondement en Mr. Leibnitz. Si Mr. Clark croit que la Question est, non dans quel sens il faut prendre le mot de miracle, mais s'il arrive quelque chose dans le monde, qu'on ne puisse expliquer d'une manière naturelle, il auroit du faire voir, que ce qu'on regarde comme miracle, ne surpasse pas les forces des choses corporelles. Il semble donc qu'il n'a aucune raison de se vanter des argumens, qu'il allegue pour prouver la Définition, que Spinoze donne d'un miracle. Il

of Nature, they were no longer taken for Miracles. *Venus* seldom passes thro' the Sun's Disk, yet no body is inclined to believe it a Miracle. *Spinoza*, who believ'd that every Thing happen'd naturally, might very well say, that Miracles are uncommon Events; for if every Thing that happens in the Universe is produced by natural Causes, Miracles can be nothing else. If *Lock* was not of *Spinoza's* Opinion, he is wrong to adopt his Idea, since he denies the Premises, and admits the Consequence; and *Dr. Clarke*, who admits immediate Operations of God in the Universe, has not done better in adopting it. When the Question is about the Sense of a Word in its common Use, which should not be departed from without Necessity, common Expressions ought to be consulted, which this Author unreasonably blames in Mr. *Leibnitz*. If *Dr. Clarke* believes the Question to be, not in what Sense the Word Miracle ought to be taken, but that if a Thing should happen in the Universe, that cannot be explain'd in a natural Way; he should have shewn that what we look upon as Miracles do not surpass the Powers of corporeal Substances. There
seems

est surprenant qu'il appelle les forces de la nature, &c. des mots qui ne signifient rien, et qu'il ne puisse comprendre ce que c'est qu'une *Action naturelle*. On appelle *action naturelle* celle, qu'on peut expliquer par la *struëture des corps*, selon les regles ordinaires du mouvement : Ce qui est contraire a la *struëture des corps*, et aux regles du mouvement est *supernaturel*, et un *miracle*, parce qu'il ne peut etre fait que par la *puissance immediate de Dieu*. On ne demande pas ainsi s'il est plus difficile à Dieu de faire un miracle, que de contribuer à un evenement extraordinaire, et on seroit curieux de voir par quel argument on peut prouver, que c'est agir contre la raison et contre l'*equité*, que d'appeller l'*attraction* un miracle, ou de dire que ce n'est pas un terme *Philosophique* : Mr. Leibnitz la croit telle non entant que c'est un *Phenomene*, mais entant qu'on soutient que c'est une *qualité*, que Dieu a donné librement à la matiere, et dont il n'y a d'autre raison que la *Volonté*, ou la *Puissance de Dieu*. Il n'est pas necessaire de repondre à cette accusation, que l'*Harmonie preetablie* est une *Hypothese etrange*, qui choque la raison : On ne l'appelle ainsi que, parce

seems then to be no Reason for his boasting of the Arguments he brings to prove the Definition which *Spinoza* has given of a Miracle. It is surprizing, that he should call the Powers of Nature, &c. empty Words, and that he cannot comprehend what a natural Operation is; we call that a natural Operation, which is explicable by the Structure of Bodies according to the ordinary Rules of Motion; what is contrary to the Structure of Bodies and Rules of Motion is supernatural, and a Miracle, because it cannot be performed, but by the immediate Power of God. We do not then ask, if it be more difficult for God to work a Miracle, than to contribute to an extraordinary Event; and I should be glad to see by what Argument he can prove, that it is acting contrary to Reason and Justice to call Attraction a Miracle, or to say that is an unphilosophical Term. Mr. *Leibnitz* believes it so, not as it is a Phænomenon, but as it is maintained to be a Quality, which God has freely given to Matter, and for which there is no Reason assignable, but the Will or Power of God. It is not necessary to make
any

parce qu'on ne l'entend pas, comme il paroît par la Metaphysique de Mr. Wolf. Ce qu'on allegue contre le Mechanisme prouve seulement, que dans la connoissance de la Nature on n'est pas encore parvenu à connoître tout, mais nullement, que les choses en elles memes, et de leur nature, sont inexplicables.

16. *Quand on entend par l'Attraction, la Gravitation, &c. des Phenomenes, on les admet, autant que par des remarques justes on prouver qu'elles se trouvent dans la nature, et non autrement : On ne blame pas non plus la methode de s'en servir pour l'Explication des autres Evenemens. Mais quand on entend par ces choses là, des choses qu'on ne sçauroient expliquer par la structure des corps, et les regles du mouvement, on les appelle Qualites occultes, et Asyles de l'Ignorance ; et on a raison de blamer ceux, qui les regardent comme les causes des actions naturelles, quoi qu'ils n'ayent pas prouvé, qu'elles soient actuellement presentes.*

17. *Pour*

any Answer to his Accusation, that the pre-established Harmony is a strange Hypothesis, contrary to Reason: He calls it so, because he does not understand it, as appears by Mr. *Wolf's* Metaphysique. What he alleges against Mechanism only proves, that in the Knowledge of Nature we are not arrived to the Knowledge of the whole; but by no Means, that the Things are inexplicable in themselves, or in their Nature.

16. When Attraction, Gravitation, &c. are call'd Phænomena, we admit them, in as much as by just Observation we prove they are found in Nature, and not otherwise: Nor do we blame the Method made use of for the Explication of other Events. But when we understand by these Things, Things that cannot be explained by the Structure of Bodies, and the Rules of Motion, we call them occult Qualities and Asylums of Ignorance; and we with Reason blame those who look on them as the Causes of natural Actions, tho' they have not proved, that they are actually present.

17. To

17. Pour conclurre. Ce qu'on allegue contre le Principe d'une raison suffisante, qu'on ne veut admettre qu'entant qu'il ne porte aucun prejudice aux Imaginations, qu'on s'est formé, ne demande point de reponse, parce que Mr. Wolf dans sa Metaphysique l'a suffisamment expliqué et prouvé.

17. To Conclude. What this Author alleges against the Principle of sufficient Reason, which he will not allow, but so far as it is not prejudicial to the Notions he has formed of it, requires no Answer, since Mr. *Wolf* in his *Metaphysicks* has sufficiently explain'd and prov'd it.

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A DE-

A D E F E N C E

*Of Dr. CLARKE'S Fifth Reply to
Mr. LEIBNITZ, in Answer to
Mr. THUMMIG.*

I.

MR. Leibnitz in § 3. of his fifth Paper asserted, “That *Reasons in the Mind* of a wise Being, and *Motives in any Mind* whatsoever, do that which answers to the Effect produced by *Weights in a Balance.*” And in § 14. To shew, “That the Want of a sufficient Reason is common both to *Agents* and *Patients*: “They want a sufficient Reason of their Action, as well as of their Passion. A *Balance* does not only not act, when it is equally pull’d on both Sides; but the equal *Weights* likewise do not act, when they are in an *Equilibrium.*” Hence it appears, that a Comparison is made, not only

only between *Motives* and *Weights*, but the *Mind* and a *Balance* : The *Mind* is moved by *Motives*, as the *Balance* by *Weights*. Therefore this Comparison is not, as Mr. *Thummig* affirms, *ill explained by Dr. Clarke*, who had no Right to explain it in a Sense different from this approved of in the *Theodicée* : That “ a Man’s *Soul* may be compared to a *Balance*, wherein *Reasons* and “ *Inclinations* are in the Place of *Weights*.”

The *Mind* is *active* and *percipient*, it commands the Exercise of its own Faculties, and the Movement of the Body ; it can direct its Thoughts to any particular Object, and withdraw them from that to consider other Objects ; it can compel the Body to move, can retard, accelerate, or stop its Motions ; this is the *self-determining* or *active* Power in the *Mind* : In all *Perceptions*, whether of external Objects convey’d by the Senses, or of Truths practical and speculative obtained by comparing, compounding, or abstracting Ideas, it is entirely *passive*. The Command that there is in the *Mind* over Thoughts, and over Motions of the Body, constitutes Man an *Agent*, and distinguishes him from a *passive* Machine, which cannot

act, but is *acted upon* by Weights and Powers. Experience is a sufficient Proof of human Liberty. Before Men move, they are conscious of the Power they have to move, or not to move, in any particular Manner, and having moved, can immediately after move in a contrary Direction. They have Experience of this in a vast Variety of Actions; and if in some injurious Instances they refuse the Trial, it is not for Want of a Power, which they are conscious of possessing, but that it is cruel to demand a Proof of this Power by mischievous Actions, when the innocent are sufficient, and of equal Force. This Sporting with our Wills is inconsistent with *Necessity*. Beings, *necessarily* impell'd, cannot diminish, add, alter, or counteract their Forces and Directions; but are invariably the same. Men change Habits, lose them, and acquire contrary Habits; they are inconstant, variable, and will often fly from one Extreme to its opposite: We see nothing like this in Beings impell'd by Necessity. * A

* See this Argument, which escaped Dr. Clarke, finely pursued by Dr. Sykes in his *Principles and Connexion*, &c.

Balance is determined by the Overplus of Weight, and therefore the Motion of the Balance is not to be compared with human Actions, unless it can be proved, that Motives compel as *necessarily* as the heavier Weight preponderates in a Balance; which, if true; then † “ there would be no such
 “ Thing as an *Agent* or *Action* in the Universe. Neither Man, nor Angel, nor
 “ even God himself, would *act* in any other
 “ Sense than a *Balance*, supposing it endowed with Perception. The Consequence
 “ of this is, There would be in the Universe all Patient, and no Agent; all Effect, and no Cause; which is a manifest
 “ and most express Contradiction.”

A violent Passion, or strong Motive, is not always follow'd by a correspondent Motion in the Body; or the active Principle is not thereby necessarily impelled, which would be destructive of Agency; for *Action* and *Necessity* are contradictory Ideas: *Necessarily* acting is not *acting*, but being *acted upon*. When a strong Passion rises in

† Dr. Clarke's 2d Letter to a Gentleman at Cambridge.

the Mind, and renders the Man uneasy, and is ready to break forth, the Will or active Power does not always and immediately comply with it, but may restrain it, till render'd calm and quiet by Reason. Dr. *Clarke* has compared passive Perceptions or Motives to the Eye: As seeing the Way is distinct from walking in it, so is the Perception or last *Judgment* of the Understanding, distinct from the actual Exertion of the *self-motive Power*. It is the confounding the last Judgment of the Understanding, which is always *passive*, with the *active* Principle, that has occasioned the many Errors and false Arguments upon this Subject. Good Beings act in Conformity to reasonable Motives, and wicked Men generally govern themselves by abused Passions, and a mistaken Interest: From the Characters of Men therefore we can often judge, how they will act under certain Circumstances. Hence some have denied a *self-motive Power* in the Mind; observing the Connection between Mens Characters and Actions, and the Conformity of Action to the last Judgment of the Mind: But this can be no Proof, that Men are not Agents,

i. e. have no *Principle* of Action distinct from *Motives*, which are passive. For upon Supposition, that intelligent Beings should be endued with a self-motive Power, the same Appearances would happen: For good Beings would always act in Conformity to Truth, notwithstanding a Physical Power to counteract it. What therefore may be said upon the Supposition of our having been created Free-Agents, can be no Objection against Free-Agency; nor any Proof that we are mere *automata*, Beings necessarily impell'd, or destitute of Agency.

If that Command we have over our Thoughts, and the Motion of our Bodies, is the necessary Effect of passive Motives, then Men are mere Machines indued with Intelligence or Perception, and cannot really act, but like a Clock must be acted upon. Suppose then a Clock to perceive the Motions of its Wheels, Weights and Indices, could it perceive them as depending upon, or proceeding from itself as the Cause? Would the Clock perceive them as the Consequences of its Perceptivity? No more than we can believe the Circulation of the Blood, Respiration and other invo-

luntary Motions to be caused by our Minds. We do not call These our Actions, and can plainly distinguish them from what are properly so named. Respiration is not an Effect of any Operation in the Mind, tho' we can stop it for some Time, quicken or retard it without any Motive, but merely because we will it, or as a Trial and Proof of the self-motive Power within us. This Power we cannot define, because a *simple Idea*, and therefore distinct from *Motives*, which are often compounded of many Ideas.

From these Arguments it appears, that an *active Principle* distinguish'd from *Motives* is not a *Chimæra*; that it may act without any other Motive than itself; and consequently that the Comparison between a *Balance* and the *Soul*, or between *Weights* and *Motives* is groundless and unjust.

Contrary Motives, when exactly equal, cannot indeed " excite in the Soul an *Inclination* or *Will* (here *Will* is taken for a *passive* Desire, and not the *self-motive Power*) but this is no Reason why the Mind should be unable to act. In Things capable of being performed after different
Ways

Ways, the *Will* may act, though the Mind perceives no Reason to determine one particular Way rather than another. If this be false, it will follow. 1. That God could not determine the Situation of any two Particles if exactly equal. He that thinks it impossible for God to create two Particles of Matter the same in all Respects, except Number, should shew, that after God hath exerted his Power in one Instance, he cannot exert the same Power in the same Manner again : But it is ridiculous thus to limit the divine Power. Mr. *Thummig* says, “ *These Arguments also shew*, that it is “ *absolutely impossible* for two Particles of “ Matter to be exactly alike, and conse- “ quently, &c. What, *these Arguments may also shew*, I cannot conceive ; for I do not find any *Arguments* at all. The Word *Demonstration* is indeed mentioned, but nothing is demonstrated. Instead of demonstrating what he pretends he *can* demonstrate, he treats his Adversary with great Contempt, threatening what he could do, and then leaves him without doing any Thing at all. Immediately after follow the Words, *These Arguments*, &c. There may
be

be Reasons to determine the Deity to create many Particles of Matter exactly alike ; but no other possible Reason than mere Will for the Situation of these Particles, the Situation of one, being equally fit for any of the rest ; because all are exactly equal and alike. 2. It must follow, that God could not have created the World less than *infinite*. For since all the Parts of Space are exactly uniform and alike, there could be no possible Reason for creating in this, rather than any other Part of *Space*, but mere *Will*. If therefore the Will cannot determine where there is no *Difference*, the World must have been *infinite*, or not created. 3. That the World could not have been created in Time ; for there could be no *Preference* of any Instant in *Duration*, each Moment thereof being as *uniform* or alike, and therefore *indifferent*, as are the Parts of Space. 4. That God could not have, or has not, created the World. For how can we conceive that there should be any Ground for *Preference* among the minutest Points of *Place* and *Time*, or possible Parts and Sizes of material Beings, all which are *infinitely divisible*?

That

That the World could not have been created the least *Portion* of *Time* sooner or later, nor by the least *Atom* greater or less, not any *one* Part otherways than it was, are Things as impossible to be proved as they are incapable of being conceived. It is a strange *Philosophy*, which takes from the supreme Being *all* Power of *acting*, where Reasons are *equal*, or two Ways of acting *indifferent*. But Mr. *Thummig* affirms, “ it ought not to be said, that an “ equal, apparent Goodness, in two different Ways of acting, takes away from “ the Mind all Power of acting at all, as “ an Equality of Weights keeps a Balance “ necessarily at rest”. He adds, “ the Mind “ is only *kept* from acting.” But what Difference is there in this Case, between being *kept from acting*, and not having a Power to act? Or how is the Comparison here observed between Weights and Motives? He says, “ *no Case* will ever be met “ with, where there shall be no Reason to “ determine one Way of acting more than “ another.” I have already mentioned several Instances, where Will *alone* has determined the Agent; and shall here ask
any

any *impartial* Person, whether he thinks it *impossible* for a Man to walk, when it appears indifferent to him, whether his right or left Leg moves first, or whether he sets out this, or the next Moment? Cannot a Traveller pursue his Journey, if he knows two Ways, which appear indifferent, or equally good to him? Or cannot a Man receive any Money, if he is to choose out of which Hand he will take it; the same Sum, in the same Species of Coin, being held from his View in each Hand? Many Instances of this Sort might be produced: In these the Will of the *Traveller* and *Creditor*, without any other Motives, may determine them, the *one* to pursue his Journey, the *other* to receive his Money, tho' the several Ways and distinct Sums appear *equal* or *indifferent* as to Choice. Mr. *Thummig* thinks, “ *Experience* shews the contrary, and it *could* “ be demonstrated, but Demonstration penetrates *too far* into the Knowledge of “ *contingent Things*, and *might* not be comprehended by Dr. *Clarke*, who is at a “ Loss to conceive many Things more “ easy.” What *Experience* proves in this
 Case

Case must be left to every Man's Conscience: What *Demonstration* this Writer may have is as well suppressed, as delivered; for if a Man of Dr. *Clarke's* very great Abilities could not comprehend it, I think it must be incomprehensible to Men of very *extensive* Knowledge, and of the greatest *Clearness* and *Judgment* in Reasoning. They, who are acquainted with the excellent Writings of our late Dr. *Clarke*, will rather pity the Man, than be provoked at such vain Sentences, in which he too much abounds.

Dr. *Clarke* is charged with *representing the Soul in a corporeal Manner by Imagination*, because he said the *Motive or Thing consider'd as in View is something extrinsic to the Mind*. In the Beginning of my Defence, the Mind was represented as *active* and *percipient*; and what is neither one, nor the other, can be no Faculty of the Soul: But *Motives* are not *active* nor *percipient*, they are the *Incitements* to Action when *perceived*, and till then are nothing to the Mind. *Motives* therefore are properly consider'd as something *extrinsic* to the Mind. This is not *Imagination*, but the

the real Truth of the Case ; nor can the Soul be “ represented in a corporeal Manner,” when consider’d as *active* and *perceptient*, Body being incapable of *Perception* and *Agency*. No Man ever wrote so strong in Favour of the *Immateriality* of the Soul as Dr. Clarke, who was so far from “ representing it a corporeal Matter,” that he demonstrated the *Impossibility* of superadding to Matter the Power of thinking. But Mr. Thummig will hardly escape his own Censure of “ *gross Misrepresentation*,” when he confounds *Action* with *Passion*, and the *Principle* of Action with *Motives*, which are *passive*. “ We commonly call, says he, “ the imperfect *Representations* of the Senses “ and the Imagination, *Passions* ; and the “ clear *Representations* of the Understanding, *Actions* : In both these Cases we “ may easily conceive the *Mind* is *active*.” This Passage shews a very strange Confusion of Ideas, and Abuse of Words. It is absolutely unintelligible to me : But Mr. Thummig “ readily grants, § 11. that neither Dr. Clarke, nor any of his Countrymen understand what Mr. Leibnitz means, when he gives to the Soul a

“ *representative*

“ *representative Faculty.*” I believe him, for it is the absurd Figment of a Foreigner. *Perceptions, Motives, Understanding,* are neither *Passions*, nor *Actions*: But the *perceptive Faculty*, not Things perceived, is *passive*; and the doing any Thing in Consequence of a *Perception* is exerting the *self-motive Power*, and is properly *Action*. To *perceive* or *understand* the Truth of any Proposition is no more an *Action*, than to perceive a Field, or a Horse, is walking or riding: The *Understanding* *perceives*; it is the *Will* that *acts*. The last *Judgment* of the *Understanding* is as *passive* as any former *Judgment*, because it is a *Perception* only, and not an *Action*; it is distinct from the *self-motive Power*, which is *active*. When Mr. *Leibnitz* said, that “ the Will “ does not always precisely follow the practical *Understanding*, because it may sometimes find Reasons to suspend its Resolutions;” --- Dr. *Clarke* observes, that he contradicted his own Hypothesis; for those very Reasons are the last *Judgment* of the practical *Understanding*. To this Mr. *Thunmig* answers, “ the Motives are imperfect, and “ the last *Judgment* not found.” But it is

is evidently the last Judgment found, and the Motives are perfect enough to “ suspend its Resolutions.” Be this a *Self-contradiction* or not, it is certainly wrong to deny a Power of acting distinct from Motives, and thus exclude all *Possibility of Action*, or real Agency out of the Universe, which is the necessary Consequence of Mr. *Thummig*’s Assertions.

What he says concerning *Hypothetical* and *Moral Necessity* does not affect Dr. *Clarke*, who observed before him, that “ they are only figurative Ways of speaking, and in philosophical Strictness of Truth, are no Necessity at all. *Necessity* in Philosophical Questions always signifies *absolute Necessity*.”

II.

There is nothing *done* or *produced* without some *Ground* or *Reason*, which is not to be determined from any particular *Circumstance*, but from the *whole* of the Case. The Reason why God created the World is not to be drawn from *Place* or *Time*, which are mere *Circumstances*; and no *sufficient*

sufficient Reason can be assigned why God might not have created *sooner* or *later*, or in a different Part of *Space*. There was sufficient Reason for the *Act* of Creation; and mere *Will* might determine the *Place* and *Duration* of created Beings, and indeed *must* have determined them; since all Parts of *Space* and *Duration* are exactly similar and alike. This alone entirely destroys the Principle of *sufficient Reason*: For hence it will appear, that God has Power to *act* where *Motives* or Reasons are *equal*. If Mr. *Wolf* has demonstrated (what is not capable of any Proof, as shall immediately be shewn) That it is impossible for God to create *two* Particles of Matter exactly alike; if we suppose the divine Power thus *limited* in the Act of Creation; yet this is but *one* single Instance, and those already mentioned remain in full Force against the *Hypothesis* of Mr. *Leibnitz*. But if in any *One* Case an intelligent Agent can act where the Motives are *equal*, this alone will determine the Dispute in Favour of Dr. *Clarke*. That the Impossibility of creating two Particles of Matter exactly alike is not to be demonstrated will appear, 1. From the Confession

of Mr. *Thummig* himself, who in the very next Article says, “ I do not deny, but “ that in different Worlds *two Things may be alike :*” But if in two Worlds, why not in two different Parts of the same World? If the first cannot be deny’d, the second will never be proved impossible. To say they have not the same *Principle of Individuation* is nothing to the Purpose; the *principium individuationis*, in this Case, being *Existence* itself: They have separate Existences, or exist in different Parts of Space: They are *two* distinct Beings, not *one* Being only; and many such similar Parts it is very probable there are. For 2. The little *solid* and constituent *Parts* of Matter, or *physical Atoms*, must, when taken of the same Dimensions, be exactly similar: And then no possible Ground of *Preference* can be conceived for the Situation of them. To deny the Reality of these component Parts is to deny *Solidity*, or the real Existence of Matter; for without such perfectly solid Particles Matter must be all *Pores*, mere Shadow, or the Phantom of Matter having nothing perfectly solid in it. When God hath exerted his Power in the Production

Production of any Thing, he may exert the same Power in the same Manner again. This is *possible* at least, and therefore no *Demonstration* of the *Impossibility* of creating two Particles of Matter exactly alike can be given. 4. The real Existence of such similar Particles cannot be proved inconsistent with the moral Attributes of God, or State of the Universe; for then the Parts of *Duration* and *Space* being alike, would also be inconsistent with them, which is absurd.

III.

That two Things exactly alike are really *two*, and not the *same* Thing under two Names, is as true as that the several Parts of *Space* are not *one* and the *same* Part of *Space*, or *two* remote Periods in *Duration*, not *one* and the *same* Instant of Time. How it can follow from the Nature of Contingencies, or Principle of Individuation, that *two* Things alike are only *one* and the *same* Thing, is impossible to be understood or conceived. Two of the same Species cannot exist in the same *Place* at

the same *Time*, one necessarily excluding the other ; but they may exist in distinct Places, tho' so perfectly alike as to be distinguishable only by the Difference of their Situation. They could not in this Case coincide or become *one* ; and the separate Existence of each is the *principium individuationis*, excluding all other Beings of the same kind from the same Place at the same Time, which Place is then communicable to no other Being of that *Species*. Hence it follows, that two Particles will be as distinguishable in *one* as in *two* Worlds, whether consider'd by *Abstraction*, or as actually existing. To define the *Principle of Individuation*,---*That which determines a Thing in its Essence*,---is *ignotum per ignotius* ; for we know not what determines the *Essences* of Things. *Real Essences* are far removed from our Knowledge and Discovery ; we can reason only from *Properties*, not from the *Foundation* or *Constitution* of *Properties*, of which we know nothing at all. How clear Mr. *Leibnitz*, or his Follower is upon this Subject ; How free from Contradiction ; And how easy it is for Mr. *Thummig* to answer Dr. *Clarke*, requires no great

great Depth in Metaphysics to determine.

IV.

If there were no *Vacuum*, there could be no *Motion* : Air and Water would be as *impenetrable* to their Inhabitants as Flint or Iron : All Matter would be equally *solid*, and no one Particle could *yield* to another, having no *vacant* Space to possess or move into.

To prove a *Vacuum*, Dr. *Clarke* urged the *Want* of *Resistance* in an *exhausted Receiver* : Against this it is asserted, without any *Appearance* of Argument, that *Resistance* arises not from the *Quantity* of *Matter*, but its *Difficulty* of giving *Place*. And because Dr. *Clarke* has not proved (what he actually did prove) the *Quantity* of *Matter* to be the Cause of *Resistance*, therefore, says this Writer, “ it is plain “ he has examin’d Things very *superficially*.” Before he pass’d this unjust Censure, Why did he not offer *one* Argument to shew, that *Resistance* is owing to the *Difficulty* of giving *Place*, and not to the *Quantity* of *Matter* ? Is it not as in-

cumbent upon *him* as Dr. *Clarke* to prove his Assertions? Let him first vindicate Mr. *Leibnitz* from that *wonderfully unphilosophical* Instance of *floating Timber* containing *less heavy Matter*, and making more *Resistance* than an equal Bulk of *Water*: Than which nothing can betray a more *superficial* Examination of Things.

The *Resistance* of Matter, it is said, arises from its *Difficulty* of giving Place. I answer; If there is a *Difficulty* in Matter to give Place, then Matter *resists* an Alteration of Place; it *resists* every Alteration, and is therefore *difficult* to be alter'd: This *Difficulty* therefore arises from the *Resistance*, and is greater or less in Proportion to the *Quantity* of Matter. For if it did not *resist* an Alteration, the Alteration could not be *difficult*; and if the *Resistance* or *Difficulty* was not according to the *Quantity* of Matter, the whole Earth would not be more *difficult* to move than a Tennis-Ball.

If by *Difficulty* of yielding no more was intended than a strong Cohesion or *Tenacity* of Parts, Dr. *Clarke* observed, that this was nothing to the Purpose, the Question relating

lating to *Fluids*, which have little or no *Tenacity*, to Water and *Quick-Silver*.

But it is ridiculous in them to suppose a mere *Difficulty of giving Place*, who assert an absolute *plenum*, in which State all *giving of Place*, as I have shewn, must be absolutely *impossible*.

V.

If there is a *Vacuum*, there must be *Space*, real *Space* void of Matter: What this *Space* is, whether the *Relation of Bodies*, a mere *Idea*, a *Creature* of the *Imagination*, the *Possibility* of Matter's existing, *Matter* itself; or whether it is a *Substance*, a *Mode* or *Property* of Existence, *something* or *nothing*; lastly, whether it is not *necessary*, *eternal*, *immutable*, and the *Immensity* of God; which of these various and contradictory Notions is the true one, has long been the Subject of Debate: Every one of them hath been asserted, and thick *Darkness* and *Confusion* raised by the very different Accounts of this controverted Object. To remove *Obscurity*, and much *Rubbish* out of the Way, it will be necessary to

consider first, how we acquire an Idea of *Space*.

1. If we suppose the Air not immediately to fill up the vacant Tract, a Bird or Bullet may leave in any Period of their Motion, we have an Idea of empty or *void Space*; which may be acquired by considering the World as *finite*; for beyond the Limits of Matter must be Space. If again we suppose this empty *Space fill'd* up, it then ceases to be *empty*, but is not annihilated or lost, for we have still an Idea of the same *Space remaining* in which Matter exists. If the Presence of Matter destroy'd *Space*, then Matter must exist in *no Space*, *no where*, or could *not* exist at all. *Space* therefore does not depend upon Matter; for whether Matter exists or not, *Space* cannot be conceived as *absent*, or supposed not to be.

2. Having acquired an Idea of *Space*, we can easily determine, whether it is *Something*, or *Nothing*. For of *Nothing* we can have *no* Idea; *Nothing* has *no* Being, *no* Properties; but *Space* has the *Capacity* of containing Bodies, has *Dimensions*, is *infinite*, *eternal*, and absolutely *necessary*. A
necessarily

necessarily existing, infinite, and eternal Nothing, is a shocking Absurdity! *Space* is therefore something real. *

3. Hence it also follows, that *Space* is not a mere *Idea*; for we cannot possibly conceive it *absent*, or less than *infinite*: It is a Contradiction to suppose it *not* to be, nothing being *conceivable* without it. For whatever exists must exist *some where*, for to exist *no where*, is *not* to exist at all. It cannot therefore be an *imaginary* Thing, or mere *Idea*, which is so *necessary*, that *no Existence* is even *possible* without it: And if you could by the Power of *Imagination* assign *Limits* to it (which might be done, if it were a *Chimæra* or *Creature of the Imagination*) from those *Limits* there would be an *infinite, eternal, and necessary* No-

* I observe, That the Case of *Darkness*, or a *Privation* of *Light*, has greatly obscured this Subject. It has been said, that we have as *positive* an *Idea* of *Darkness*, as of *Space*; and that *Darkness* has *all* the *Dimensions* and *Properties* ascribed to *Space*: But *Darkness*, and therefore *Space*, is *nothing* real.

There is a gross Fallacy in this Instance: For in the *Idea* of *Darkness* is contained the *real* *Dimensions* of *Space*, not of *Darkness*; a *dark* or *unilluminated* *Space* is conceived, which *Space*, not *Darkness*, or the mere *Absence* of *Light*, has *real* *Properties* and *Dimensions*.

THING,

THING, which is a Contradiction. Therefore all that Mr. *Thummig* says concerning *imaginary Infinites* is either false, or nothing to the Purpose. He “denies that a “mere *Idea* can extend beyond *finite*.” Yet it is most evident, that tho’ the Mind in conceiving *infinite*, finds it impossible to be reach’d, and can frame no other Image, or *Idea*, but what is capable of a farther *Increase*, and is therefore *finite*, yet Reason may demonstrate the *infinite*, not capable in itself of any *Increase* or *Subtraction* whatever. Thus it is shewn to be with *Space*: we cannot frame any *Idea* of it so large, as not to admit of farther *Increase*, and yet Reason proves it *actually infinite*. *Space* is not therefore a mere *Idea*; the *Idea* we frame of it being an *increasing Idea*, a *finite Idea*, and not as *Space* is in itself, really *infinite*.

Of the *Principle* of *Individuation* enough has been said in Answer to § 3. The Difference between *Matter in abstracto* and *Space* is, that the one is a mere *abstract Idea*, the other a *real Infinite*. *Space* is absolutely *necessary*, *Matter* is not: *Space* would remain, if all *material Beings* were annihilated,

annihilated, but *Matter* cannot exist without *Space*, Hence it follows, that *Space* is not *Matter*; which this Author “ grants, “ tho’ not as a Consequence from Dr. “ *Clarke’s* Reasons,” and yet the Conclusion is as evident from those as from any other Reasons whatever.

4. As *Space* is not *Matter*, so neither is it the *Possibility of the Existence of Matter*. For 1. *Space* is *Quantity*, but *Possibility* is not *Quantity*. 2. *Matter* is properly said to exist *in Space*; but it would be absurd to say *Matter* exists *in the Possibility of the Existence of Matter*. 3. The Existence of *Matter* would be absolutely *impossible*, if there were no *Space*, for to exist *in no Space*, or *no where*, is not to exist at all. 4. It is *possible* for *Matter* to exist *in Space*, but *Space* is not that *Possibility*, but the Ground of the *Possibility*, the *causa sine quâ non*, and without which the *Existence* of *Matter* would be *impossible*. 5. We may as well say, that *Duration* is the *Possibility of the Existence of Matter*, as that *Space* is. 6. *Space* is as necessary to the Existence of *immaterial*, as *material* Beings. For that any Being whatever should exist, and yet
not

not exist *in any Place*, or *any where*, is not to be understood or conceived.

5. *Infinite Space*, being *something real*, must be either *Property* or *Substance*. If a *Substance*, it would be *immensum*, not *immensitas*, an *immense Being*, and not *Immensity*, which is as absurd, as that *infinite Duration* should be an *eternal Being*, and not *Eternity*; for we can no more conceive *Space* than *Duration* to be a *Substance*. If therefore *Space* is a *Property*, *eternal*, *immense*, *necessarily existing*, it must be the *Property* or *Attribute*, the *Immensity* or *Omnipresence* of the *one and only eternal, infinite, and necessarily existent Being*. As *infinite Duration* is not *æternum*, but *æternitas τὸ æterni*, so *infinite Space* is *immensitas τὸ immensi*, and not *immensum*. *Infinite Space* is therefore the *Omnipresence* of *Him, who is not far from every one of us, for in him we live, move, and have our Being*. Acts xvii. 27. 28. How this can be denied without excluding God from the Universe I see not. For,

6. No Being can act *where* it is *not*; if therefore God be not actually *present every where*, he must be *limited* in his *Presence*,
and

and in his Power of acting, that is, would not be *necessarily existing*, or supreme God; for *Necessity* of Existence admits of no *Limits*, but is absolute *every where*, and thro' all *Duration*. To say that God is *ubique*, but not *omnipresent* as *Space*, is to say, that he is *every where* in *Latin*, but *no where* in *English*. Nor is it less absurd to say, that he is not *actually*, but *virtually omnipresent*: For *Virtue* or *Power*, *without*, or *beyond* its Subject, is a *Word* or *Name* only, and nothing real. *Virtues* or *Powers* can no more *act*, or *be* where the *Substance* of them is not, than the Being itself can *act*, *where* it is *not*, or *be present* to, and *absent* from the same Place at the same Time. Therefore God is *actually* present *every where*, and of Consequence *infinite Space* is the *Immensify* of God, who is really *omnipresent*, not by *Virtues* working *without*, and at a *Distance beyond* Him, which is absurd and impossible, but by being *present* to all Places at all Times.

7. It is objected, that *Space* has *Parts*, but God is *essentially One*, *Ens simplicissimum*: The Answer is, That the *Parts* of *Space* are absolutely different from *corporeal* Parts; they

they are not *moveable*, *discerpable*, or *divisible* Parts; they are as incapable of *Separation*, *Corruptibility* or *Division*, as is a mathematical Point; and therefore *Immensify* is not hinder'd by its *Parts* from being essentially *One*. To this Mr. *Thummig* replies, That "it is not the Separability or Mobility, but the Presence of Parts, that makes a Being compound, and not simple," or *One*. The having no Parts distinguishes a simple from a compound Being." Space, as described by Dr. *Clarke*, is not "a simple Being, but a similar Compound." I answer 1. *Space* is not a *Being*, but a *Property* or *Attribute*; it is not *immesum*, but *Immensify*, which being *uniform*, and essentially *indivisible*, cannot be a *compound*, but is *one*, *simple*, and *uncompounded*. 2. The *Parts* of *Space* no more prove *Immensify* inconsistent with *Simplicity* or *Unity*, than the *Parts* of *Duration* prove *Eternity* inconsistent with *Simplicity* or *Unity*. *Space* is no more a *compound* than is *Eternity*: And if the *Immensify* of God is deny'd, as having *Parts* (which are not *separable*) his *Eternity* must be deny'd for the same Reason; and of Consequence his *Existence*.
For

For to be *nusquam, nunquam, never* and *no where*, is not to be at all. 3. When we speak of *similar* or *dissimilar* Compounds, we consider them as having distinct *component* Parts, of which they are *compounded*, and into which they may be *resolved* again. But this is totally different from our Idea of *Space*; which is *one* in itself, however *partially* we may consider it. 4. Properly speaking *Space* has *no* Parts, there is no actual *Presence* of Parts to *Space*. For Parts necessarily imply *Difference* and *Diversity* of Existence, but *Space* is *uniform, unalterable, indivisible*. Parts are not in *Space*, but *Space* is *partially* apprehended by us. We may consider what *finite* Quantity we please, but *Space* is *infinite* and *unbounded*. The Parts of *Space* are only *assign'd* by us to help our Conception of Things, and are in Strictness of Speech *no* Parts. Therefore *Space* is not in any Sense a *compound*, nor inconsistent with the most *simple, spiritual* and *immutable* Being.

8. That *Space* is not *Order*, or *Relation*, is evident, because *Order* or *Relation* is not *Quantity*, but *Space* is *Quantity*. The
Force

Force of this Argument will be shewn in my Answer to the ninth Article.

What “ the *Theologians* have long since “ observed” is nothing to the Purpose. For to oppose a *Name* is not to confute *Arguments*; and Authority is but a lazy Objection in Matters of Philosophy, or free Debate. *Theologians* have often asserted more than they themselves understood, and to support *Transubstantiation*, and other religious Absurdities, have invented a strange Jargon of Phrases, which they called *Metaphysique*, by no Man ever understood.

The rest of this Article is Anger and Abuse only, which deserve no Answer.

VI.

To prove *Space* different from the *Order* of Things co-existing it was urged, that if the whole material World (supposing it *finite*) was *removed* in a straight Line with any Velocity, it would not be *removed* out of its Place, if *Space* was only the *Order* of Bodies, *i. e.* it would not in Fact be *moved* at all, or there would be no Difference between *Rest* and *Motion*. Mr. *Thummig* therefore

therefore must allow *Space* and *Order* not to be the *same*, when he grants, that *a World, while it is in Motion, differs from a World at Rest*: He denies not this, but asserts only, that *after the Motion, nothing will be observed, but would have been observed, had not that Motion happen'd, i. e.* nothing would receive any Shock, by the most sudden stopping of the World, tho' moved with the greatest Velocity! As Mr. *Leibnitz* could give no Answer to this Change from a sudden *stopping*, or violent *Acceleration* of Motion, giving a sensible Shock to the Parts, so Mr. *Thummig* leaves it unanswered, saying, it is *unreasonable to require an Answer to the Objection of the Change*. It is indeed *unreasonable* to require an Answer to, or Denial of that which is most true; but if the Objection is false, an Answer might with great Reason have been expected from him.

The Instance of a *Watch* is not so clear as the Motion of the whole material World; when the whole is moved, there is no *relative* Situation with Respect to other Bodies, all Bodies being included; but the Motion of a Watch is *relative* to other external

G Bodies.

Bodies. However, this Instance of the Watch is sufficient to shew, That a sudden Stopping, or violent Acceleration of Motion, will give a great Shock to the internal Parts.

When a possible Supposition is made, has any one a Right to deny the Supposition without Reason? If I can conceive the World capable of being removed in a streight Line, without seeing any Contradiction imply'd in such Motion, surely I may suppose it possible. He that imagines there is a Contradiction in it, should certainly make the Contradiction appear; to assert the contrary is indeed very unreasonable. The *Principle of sufficient Reason* has already been answer'd: It is a *Principle* that shamefully begs the Question, and is incapable of any Proof; it is not a *principium*, but the *petitio principii*.

VII.

If the *Difference* between *absolute* and *relative* Motion is allow'd, then it must be granted, that there may be *real* Motion,
where

where there is no *relative* Motion, or a Body may move without *Relation* to other Bodies: Therefore the *Space* that Body moves in (for nothing can move without *Space*) is not the *Order* or *Relation* of Bodies. The Change is of *Place* only, not of one Body with Respect to another; that being *relative*, and not *absolute* Motion. Concerning this *Distinction*, see *Definition* the 8th of *Newton's Principia*.

VIII.

There is no Argument in this Article, which is not largely consider'd, and fully answer'd by Dr. *Clarke*; and yet no Notice is here taken of the Doctor's Answers. It is not fair thus to repeat the same Things over and over again, without taking the least Notice of what has been so forcibly urged against them.

That *Space* is not the *Order* of Bodies was proved by this Argument. *Space* is *Quantity*; but *Order* is not *Quantity*: Therefore *Space* is not *Order*. *Going before and following* constitute *Order*; but *going and following* are not *Quantity*, nor the same

with that *Space* and *Time*, in which one Body goes before or follows another. The *Order* or *Situation* of Bodies may be the same in different Intervals of *Time*, and Quantities of *Space*; and the same *Space* may contain Bodies in different *Order* at different Times: *Space* therefore is not *Order*. The “more Attention we give to “ what Mr. *Leibnitz* says concerning *Order*,” the more certain we are of his Mistake.

The *Interval* of Bodies in *Space* is *Quantity*, and not going or following, which are not *Space*, but IN *Space*. He that denies this *Interval* or *Distance* to be any Thing real, must deny, that there could be any real *Distance* between the most distant Bodies, if intermediate Bodies were remov'd; which is very absurd.

“ Things different from each other, one
 “ of which is distinct from the other, yet
 “ together making a whole, constitute a
 “ Quantity.” This is true; but I see not
 to what Purpose it is urged: For *Order* of
 Parts is nothing but the *Situation* of Parts;
Order does not constitute the whole of those
 Parts; and if *Order* signifies “ different
 “ Things

“ Things *divisible* from each other,” it cannot be *Space*, for *Space* is uniform and *indivisible*.

If *Proportions* or *Logarithms* were real *Quantities*, and not Expressions of the Habitude or *Relations* of *Quantity*, it would not follow, that *Space* is *Order*; for *Space* is very different from a mathematical *Ratio*: It is not the *Relation* of a *Quantity*, but an *absolute Quantity* to which *Ratios* properly belong. *Proportions* of *Quantities* are not the *Quantities* of *Quantities*, which is unintelligible, but the *Comparison* of *Quantities* related, or the *Relations* of *Quantities*. A greater or less *Quantity* of *Proportion* is as absurd as a greater or less *Magnitude* of *Comparison*: *Magnitudes* are compared, but *Comparison* is not *Magnitude*; so *Quantities* are in *Proportion*, but *Proportion* is not *Quantity*. *Quantities* are increased by Addition; but the Addition of the *Proportion* of 1 to 1, to the *Proportion* of 1 to 1, makes no more than the *Proportion* of 1 to 1: Therefore *Proportions* are not *Quantities*. *Logarithms* are not a *Measure*, but artificial Indices of the *Ratios* of Numbers one to another; they are the Signs of *Pro-*

portion: The *Logarithm* of the *Proportion* of *Equality* is a real *Proportion*, but no *Quantity*, for it is a *Cypher*.

That Mathematicians have sometimes inaccurately apply'd *Quantity* to *Proportion*, is observed by Dr. *Clarke* as an Argument of no Force against him; for it is not the inaccurate Expression of Mathematicians, but Reason that has Evidence. The *bearing a less or greater Proportion* does not imply a *less or greater Quantity* of *Proportion*, but the *Proportion* of a *less or greater Quantity*: And *duplicate* or *triplicate Proportion* do not mean a double or triple *Quantity* of *Proportion*, but twice or thrice repeating the *Proportion*. *

* Dr. *Clarke* has given an Example, which sets this Matter in a very clear Light. "The Tripling of any
" Magnitude or Quantity *once* produces a Magnitude or
" Quantity, which to the former bears the Proportion of
" 3 to 1. The Tripling it a *second* Time produces (not
" a *double Quantity* of Proportion, but) a Magnitude or
" Quantity, which to the former bears the Proportion
" (called *duplicate*) of 9 to 1. The Tripling it a *third*
" Time produces (not a *triple Quantity* of Proportion, but)
" a Magnitude or Quantity, which to the former bears
" the Proportion (called *triplicate*) of 27 to 1: And
" so on." *Fide* *Barrow's* Mathematical Lectures. Lect. xx.

I see no possible Grounds for an Argument *ad hominem* against Dr. Clarke in this Affair of *Proportion*: He reasons here, as upon all other Occasions, with great *Plainness, Force, and Consistency*. Whether Mr. *Leibnitz* is consistent with himself, in all those *Contradictions* he stands charged with by Dr. Clarke, must be left to the Judgment of the Reader. They are very numerous, and it is needless to recite them upon this Occasion: One I shall just mention, because Mr. *Thummig* thinks it “no
 “ Ways inconsistent.” In § 56. of the 5th Letter it is said, “ absolutely speaking one may conceive, on peut concevoir, that an Universe began sooner than it actually did;” but in § 55. it is called “ *unintelligible, rien d'intelligible;*” and in the 4th Paper, § 15. “ it is impossible to suppose God might have created the World sooner.” If a Contradiction is possible, I think this must be one: *We can conceive an Universe began sooner; and yet it is an impossible Supposition, and is far from falling under our Ideas,* i. e. not to be conceived.

IX

It is already proved, that *Space* cannot be dependent upon Matter, if the Universe is *finite* and *moveable*. The Author here denies, that the Motion of the Universe is therefore possible because it is finite. If infinite, it would be incapable of being moved on in a streight Line ; but if *finite*, I cannot possibly conceive it *immoveable*, or not in its Nature capable of Motion. The Question is not, whether God *will* move it, or if it be *wise* for him to do so; but whether it is *absolutely impossible* to be mov'd by any Power: He that thinks it impossible will do well to shew, from the *Nature of Things*, the Reason or Ground of that *Impossibility*; without which he can have no Right to say it is impossible. The *Hypothesis* of *sufficient Reason* here is nothing to the Purpose: It is a mere *Hypothesis*. If there is any Thing in the Nature of a finite Universe, which determines it to be *necessarily* incapable of Motion, it could not be conceived as *moveable*; and yet I have as clear a Conception of a *moveable, finite Uni-*
verse

verse, as of any Thing whatever. When the *Possibility* of such evident Instances is deny'd, there is an End of all Reasoning.

It is a very great and surprizing Error this Author falls into, when he asserts, that “ should the World be NECESSARILY *eternal*, it would depend upon FREE WILL, “ as to its Existence.” That is, it would not be a *necessarily eternal* Existence, and yet, would be *necessarily eternal*; or it would be *necessarily eternal*, and yet the *Production* of *Free Will*, *Preference*, and *Choice*, *i. e.* not *necessary* at all! *Necessity* excludes all Possibility of Non-Existence, and admits of no Limits, is inconsistent with *Preference*, and *independent* on any *Will*. To be *necessarily eternal*, is to be *immense*, *immutable*, and *one*. Therefore, that “ *one of many Worlds equally possible*” should be *necessarily eternal*; and that “ a *necessarily eternal* World should depend upon *Free Will* as to its Existence,” are most express Contradictions.

That

X.

That *Space* is constituted, or caused by the Existence of God, is not “barely asserted,” but proved over and over again by Dr. *Clarke*; and the Reason Mr. *Thummig* assigns for the not proving (what has been proved) is shewn to be false in every Reply the Doctor made to Mr. *Leibnitz*. It has been shewn, that *Space* is not *immensum*, but *immensitas*; is a *Property*, and not a *Substance*; is *necessary*, *eternal*, *immutable*; and therefore the *Property* and Attribute of the *necessarily* existing Being, *i. e.* of God: Who is not *Immensify* or *Eternity*, but is *always*, and *every where* present; and by existing *every where*, and *always*, constitutes or causes *eternal Duration* and *Immensify*, or *infinite Space*. No more is meant by *causing* of *Space* than this; that *Immensify* is the *necessary* Consequence or Effect of *necessary* Existence: For that the Existence of God should be absolutely *necessary*, as it certainly is, and yet *no where*, or not *every where*, is a manifest Contradiction.

This

XI.

This Article contains no Argument, and deserves no Answer.

XII.

It is certainly “ the Part of him, who
 “ asserts the Position, to make it intelli-
 “ gible.” But when Things evident to
 the common Sense of Mankind, and uni-
 versally understood, are deny’d, and treat-
 ed as *unintelligible* by a few *Metaphysicians*;
 surely something more is to be expected
 than the calling them *unintelligible*; some
 Contradiction or Absurdity (if any there
 are) should be shewn in the common Opi-
 nion: It is easy to say Things are *unin-
 telligible*; but this is no Answer, no Argu-
 ment to him who is conscious of under-
 standing them. It is indeed very “ fur-
 “ prizing,” that *seeing* with our *Eyes*, and
bearing with our *Ears*, should be called
unintelligible Positions; or that “ the Ima-
 “ ges of Things are convey’d by the Or-
 “ gans of Sense into the Sensory, where
 “ the

“ the Soul perceives them,” a Position not to be understood! “ Let it, says Mr. Thummig, be shewn in what Manner they are convey’d.” Let the Manner be what you will, the *Fact* is certain and universally known.

Men, who have ever consider’d *Anatomy*, see how wonderfully the *Organs* of *Sense* are adapted to the *Reception* and *Conveyance* of their proper Objects. They know that the *Images* of Things are painted on the *Retina* of the Eye, and thence convey’d by *Optic Nerves* to the Brain: They find the Parts of the *internal* Ear fitted for Conveyance of *Sound*; and perceive the *Brain* to be a Substance most proper for the Reception of Objects convey’d. If the Substance of the Brain was *hard* or impenetrable, it would not easily admit the *Impressions*; and if *fluid*, they must be shatter’d, confused, and disturbed by every Motion of the Body. It must be therefore very unreasonable to suppose, that the Knowledge of material Objects is not drawn from *Impressions* made on the Brain, by Means of the Organs of Sense. For to what other Use can these *Organs* or the *Brain*

Brain be subservient? There are a Variety of Arguments to prove, that the Soul *perceives* Impressions in the Brain; and that even *Memory* in this State is dependent upon it. We see the *Tempers* of Men, their *Sense*, *Recollection*, alter'd by the different State of the *Brain*: We know this to be *fact* from Experience. For when that Substance is injur'd by a Fever, or a Fall, *Sense* and *Memory* are disturbed: When it is affected with strong Liquors, how are the Dispositions of Men chang'd! The *good-natur'd* become *cruel*; the *morose* and *sullen*, gay and *cheerful*; *Avarice* is turn'd into *Generosity*; and *Folly* and *Madness* take the Place of good *Sense* and *Reason*. When the Brain is disturbed, its *Impressions* partake of the Disturbance, and the Mind *perceives* them as they are. Whence is that Rise or Fall of the Spirits (to use a common Expression) in the same Person at different Times? Whence that *Decay* of *Memory* in old Age, and strong *Tenacity* in Youth? Whence the Alterations in the *Memory*, &c. and different State of the Mind upon Sicknefs, Pain, or any bodily Affection? Whence, I say, can these proceed,

ceed, if there is * “no physical Communication between the Soul and the Body”? By Sickness some Men have lost the Remembrance of all past Actions; *Memory* in them has seemed to be totally destroy'd, and yet after some Years they have recover'd it again. Consider the Effects of *paralytic* Disorders. If *Memory* depended not upon the *Impressions* in the Brain, and was entirely in the Soul itself, I cannot see why in *Imagination* the Images should be more *faint* than in their first *Impression*. The *cancelling* or *wearing out*, and *renewing* of Images or Objects is properly said of *Impressions* made upon a *material* Organ; but is strange Language, when apply'd to the Soul itself. We ought carefully to observe, that these *Disorders* and *Imperfections* are not in the *Soul*, but the *Body*: The Mind *perceives* the *Impressions*, as they are in the Brain. When the Brain is heated and disturbed, the Mind *perceives* the *Impressions* confused, irregular; when the Brain is cool, and in a quiet State the Mind *per-*

* Theodicee. p. 172.

ceives clear and distinct Images. When Water is calm it reflects Images entire and distinct to the Eye; when rough or agitated, the Images are broken and confused: So it is with *Impressions* in the Brain. This shews a *Communication* between the *Body* and the *Soul*, in which the latter only *acts*; for *Matter* is absolutely *passive* * and *inert*; *Inactivity* is of its *Essence*. That the *Soul acts* upon the *Body* is as evident a Fact as any confirm'd by universal Experience. The *Manner* how it acts, or how it is united to the *Body*; by what *Medium*, or in what *Manner*, is not to be known by us till in a State of *separate* Existence. I cannot leave this Subject without removing some Objections against the *Permanency* of *Impressions* in the Brain.

1. It is said, " the *Picture* of a Sound " is unintelligible." This is certainly true; because the Word *Picture* is a very inaccu-

* See this proved in the *Inquiry into the Nature of the human Soul*, and a *Dialogue between Philo and Matho*. Books of great Service to *Religion* and *Philosophy*; which convey the most *rational*, *just* and *clear* Notions of God, the *Soul*, and the *Universe*; and if attended to as they deserve, will subvert all *Scepticism* and *Irreligion*.

rate Term for the *Impressions* made on the Brain. A *Picture* is indeed form'd upon the *Retina*, or Bottom of the Eye, but beyond that all is dark ; and we see no Contrivance in the Formation of the Parts to carry on the *Picture* any farther. An *Impression* of *Sound* or *Smell* is intelligible ; but it is observable, these *Impressions* are not so strong, permanent, and distinct, as the *Impressions* of *Sight* or *Vision*. The *Sound* of a single *Note* will sometimes raise an entire *Tune*, we have formerly heard, and a *Word* excite or bring several *Lines* to Remembrance, even when we do not think of recollecting them ; we find they will force themselves upon us when the Mind does not endeavour to bring them into View ; and the Image of the *Person*, from whom we received the *Lines*, or the *Tune* will also be excited : This is evidently a *Mechanical* Connexion ; and therefore not the Work of the Mind itself, which only perceives these *Impressions* or Images when excited. I would observe, that *Impressions upon the Soul* is very odd Language, and inconsistent with its *Immateriality*. Perception, not *Impression*, belongs to the *Soul*:

It can receive no *material Impression*, but *perceives* the *Impressions* made on a *material Organ*, to which it is present. Since the Mind is *percipient all alike*, and has no Part *impercipient*, it must *perceive always* the Images that are in it; for it has no *impercipient Place* to *cover* or *hide* any Images from View. If *Impressions* therefore were made *upon* the *Soul*, and retained by it without any *corporeal Seat* of *Impressions*, they must *always*, and necessarily be *perceived* by it; for the *Understanding*, like the Eye, must see or *perceive* all Objects *impress'd*: The Consequence is, there could be no *Oblivion* or *Recollection* (all being *perceived as present*) no *cancelling*, no *wearing away*, *renewing*, &c. the contrary of which is found to be true from Experience.

2. It may be ask'd, "how so *small* a " *Superficies* can *contain* almost an infinite Number of Images or *Impressions*, and *retain* them?" *Pictures* I will not call them, till it is proved, that *Pictures* are really form'd on the Brain; *Impressions* they certainly are. It is observed, the *Brain* is larger in *Man* than in any other Animal;

H

and

and therefore he has a more capacious *Receptacle* or Store-house for the Images of external Objects. Consider the extensive Prospect, the almost infinite Number of Rays, admitted thro' the little *Aperture* or *Pupil* of the Eye ; where they pass in prodigious Confusion, 'till *refracted* by the *Coats* and *Humours*, they form at length a regular and exact Painting on the *Retina*. This single Instance will remove all Difficulty from supposing a Variety of Objects contained in a small Compass, by shewing how surprisngly *subtile* and *curious* some Operations are, and that from great Confusion of Objects regular Images are actually form'd.

3. " Since Matter is under a continual
 " Flux and Change, how can the Brain re-
 " tain these Impressions ?" I answer, That
 Matter is not totally chang'd by *Nou-
 rishment*, *Secretion* or *Evacuations*. *Scars*
 and *Moles* remain for many Years ; and the
Marks, with which some Children are born,
 attend them to the Grave : We see artificial
Marks made on the Arms of some Men
 never wear off, nor the *Colour* of them de-
 cay. *Impressions* therefore may endure in
 the

the Brain, notwithstanding the *Flux* and *mutable* State of Matter. But, in Truth, these *Impressions* are not so *permanent* as to want no *Renewal*. Familiarity with some Objects keep the Images of them very strong, and their Remembrance easy, whilst other *Impressions* grow faint and languid, wear out, and are recollected with Difficulty, partial and uncertain. Few can remember the minutest Actions of a Day; and a Multitude of Objects are lost for Want of strong and repeated *Impressions*: A Year obliterates many Images; and in old Age the Passages of remotest Youth are gone, incapable of being recall'd or brought back to View. The Mind is often desirous of recollecting Images that it thinks should not have escap'd, and the Brain is render'd uneasy by the Search made after them; the Mind is sure they will come to Remembrance again, tho' at that Time they cannot be recollected: Where are these Images, when the Mind cannot bring them to Remembrance? Are they in the Mind, which is *percipient*, and yet cannot *perceive* them? Or, whence arises this Pain and Uneasiness in the *Brain*, if that is not the

Seat of *material Impressions*? But I fear I have digressed too long in explaining this Affair. * I now return to Mr. *Thummig*.

How God perceives Things we know not, but are certain, that his *Presence* is necessary to His *Perception* of Things. For where the Agent is not, *there* he cannot *perceive*: And if therefore he is not *present* to all Beings, he could not *perceive* them; for no *Perception* would be *there*, because the *perceptient* Being is *absent*. A Being can no more *perceive* than *act* where it is not; and of *transmigrating Powers* or *Virtues* without, or *beyond* their *Subject*, enough has been said above in § 5. When Dr. *Clarke* asserted, that God *perceived* all Things by his actual *Presence*, he did not intend to explain the *Manner how God perceives*; for this exceeds the narrow Limits of our Knowledge: He means no more than this, That the actual *Presence* of God is necessary to his *Perception* of all Things, and that an *intelligentia supramundana* could not

* In this Article may be found the Answers to the Objections, against a *material Seat of Impressions*, made by Mr. *Brache* in his *Thoughts upon Dreaming*, in Answer to the *Inquiry into the Nature of the Soul*, &c.

perceive any Thing in a World from which it is totally *absent*. The *Presence* of God will not prove, that Matter *acts* upon God; for it cannot be proved capable of *acting* at all: On the contrary it is most true, that Matter is *inert* and absolutely passive. Nor can God be consider'd as the *Soul* of the World by being present to it: * “ For a *Soul*, is Part of a compound, “ whereof Body is the other Part, and “ they mutually affect each other as Parts “ of the same whole. But God is *present* “ to the World, not as a *Part*, but as a “ Governor, *acting upon all Things, himself* “ *acted upon by nothing.*” That “ God “ knows all Things by *producing* them “ *a-new*” is said, but not proved. That Things already *produced* are for ever *producing*, is a Contradiction: It is indeed a *Fiction* of the Schoolmen. And if true, must yet necessarily infer the actual *Presence* of God: For to say he *acts*, where he is not *present*, is to say, he is, and is not, *present* at the same Time; which is an express Contradiction in Terms.

* Dr. Clarke's second Reply.

XIII. and XIV.

In these Articles no one Argument is offer'd, and nothing attempted to be explained. I therefore proceed to the next.

XV.

It is extremely unfair in this Writer to assert, that Dr. Clarke “has given *no Reason*, and *without Doubt* had *none* to give,” to the Instance of “Monsters being Miracles, because of their Unusualness.” Dr. Clarke asserted, that “*Unusualness* is necessarily included in the Notion of a *Miracle*. Nevertheless (says he in the fourth Reply) it does not follow, that every Thing, which is *unusual*, is therefore a *Miracle*. For it may be only the *irregular and more rare Effect of usual Causes*: Of which kind are *Eclipses*, *Monstrous Births*, *Madness in Men*, and innumerable Things, which the Vulgar call *Prodigies*.” It is therefore, I say, extremely unfair in Mr. Thummig to allege, that *no Answer was*, and *NONE could be given*

given by Dr. Clarke to an Objection the Doctor had actually answer'd.

It is said over and over again, that Dr. Clarke borrow'd his Notion of Miracle from Spinoza. This is also very unfair: This is not to argue, but to fix some Reproach (if it were possible) upon the Doctor, by joyning him with an odious Name. Did Spinoza believe Miracles the Work of Divine Agency? Did he believe, that all the active Properties ascrib'd to Matter, were the immediate Operations of God in the continual Acts of his Providence? Did Spinoza believe any real Miracles, or Dr. Clarke ever contradict or deny them? Why then are the Names of these Men, different as Light and Darkeness, united together?

*Pergis pugnancia secum
Frontibus adversis componere.*

Horace.

The other Examples mentioned by Mr. Thummig are only the more rare Effects of usual Causes: And this Answer should have been consider'd before these other Examples were

given ; especially since *Eclipses* and uncommon *Births*, are no *other* Examples than the Doctor expressly mentioned as Instances of *rare Effects from usual Causes*.

That *Unusualness* is necessarily included in our Notion of *Miracles* is very evident ; and the Difference between them and *Prodigies* is, that the *Causes* of the latter are *usual*, tho' the *Effects* are *rare* or uncommon. The Reason why *Venus* seldom passes thro' the *Sun's Disk*, and the Causes of an *Eclipse*, are now well known from the *Revolution* of the *Planets* ; which *Revolution* is constant and *usual* ; tho' some particular Effects of it, as total and visible *Eclipses*, or the Passage of *Venus* thro' the Disk of the *Sun*, are not very frequent. In Times of Ignorance, when the true Cause of *Eclipses* was not known, they were ascribed to very *unusual* Causes, and therefore look'd upon as *Miracles*. In the Case of *Water ting'd with a red Colour by the Spawn of Frogs frozen and corrupt in Spring*, the Cause is nothing *unusual* ; *Frost* and *Putrefaction* are *usual*, however uncommon some particular Effects of them may be. The
 " *raising a human Body reduced to Dust,*"

is

is *unusual* both as to *Effect* and *Cause*, and is therefore properly a *Miracle*. “The *Powers* of corporeal Substances” I have no Idea of: Matter is essentially *inert*, and incapable of any *active*, inherent Powers. Dr. Clarke has proved, and no Answer is given to his Argument shewing, that those *active Powers*, commonly ascribed to *Matter*, are the *immediate Operations* of an *immaterial* Agent. The “*Operations of Nature*” is but an ill Expression for the Works of God: *Nature* is a Term very liable to abuse, and difficult to be understood. *Natural Powers* (as they are called) cannot be explained from *the Structure of Bodies*: For *Gravitation, Attraction, Cohesion, &c.* are not the Result of Structure. The former *act*, where the Bodies are not, and are therefore distinct from the Bodies they *act upon*: They are the *Impression* of an *immaterial* Cause; for *immaterial* Beings alone are *active*. *Agency* is no more to be ascribed to *Matter* than *Perception*; and he who allows *Matter* to be *active*, or have *active Properties* inherent in it, is more a Friend to the *Materialist*, than they who deny the Possibility of superadding to *Matter* a
Power

Power of acting. Indeed I have no *Conception*, no possible *Idea*, of *Agency* without *Perception*, or of an *impercipient Agent*; and therefore believe it as impossible for *Matter* to *act*, as to *think*. I wish the *Connexion* between *Intelligence* and *Agency* was more generally consider'd. But if Mr. *Thummig* will have that to be a *Miracle*, which cannot be explained "by the *Structure of Bodies* according to the Rules of "Motion:" Then *Cohesion*, and all those called the *natural Powers* of *Body*, may be *Miracles*. That is, we may call any Thing by any Name.

It is strange this Writer should so often mention the *pre-establish'd Harmony*, and yet not endeavour to answer the Doctor's Objections against it, which are numerous and strong.

I cannot but observe the odd Way he takes of confuting Things: To deny what he cannot answer; to assert very strongly; refer often to other Writers; and to prove nothing.

XVI.

It is astonishing to find this Objection against the Use of the Words *Attraction*, *Gravitation*, &c. so often repeated; when from the Beginning it has always been declared, that they were used for expressing of *Events*, of *Facts*, and not as explaining the *Causes* of Things. Let the *Cause* of Bodies *tending towards each other* be what you will, the *Phænomenon* surely may be call'd *Attraction*. Sir *Isaac Newton* says, *quâ causâ efficiente hæ attractiones peragantur, in id vero hîc non inquirô. Optice. Phænomena cælorum et maris nostri per vim gravitatis exposui; sed causam Gravitatis nondum assignavi. Princip.* These Words are cited by *Dr. Clarke*: Why then are we still told of “*occult Qualities*, and *Asylums* of Ignorance?” Or supposed to say the very Reverse of what is expressly said in as plain Language as possible? *Dr. Clarke*, it is true, has ascribed the Powers of *Gravitation*, *Attraction*, &c. to the immediate Operation of God: Suppose him mistaken, this can be no Objection against the Use
of

of those Words. Nor ought the referring such Actions to God, as the Author, be called an *Asylum of Ignorance*.

XVII.

Enough has been said under § 1. in Answer to the *Principle of sufficient Reason*. Of Reference to Books there is no End. The Author has not given *one* Argument for it, and in the Beginning of his Paper he himself calls it an HYPOTHESIS.

LETTER

A
LETTER

FROM

Mr. *LEIBNITZ*,

TO

Mr. *BURNET* of *Kemney*.

U N E L E T T R E

*Du Mr. LEIBNITZ à Mr.
BURNET de Kemney.*

*Commencée à Hamover, et expédiée
Wolfenbuttel, 24 Aoust, vieux Stile,
1697.*

M O N S I E U R,

J Ay en fin receu vos deux paquets, il n'y
a que trois ou quatre semaines, et vostre
lettre aussi m'a esté rendue par Madame
l'Electrice même. Je vous écris celle-cy au
plutost, d'autant que vous m'avez ordonné
d'accuser la reception des vostres. Il est vray
qu'estant maintenant à Bronsvic (ou la foire
prochaine m'a obligé d'aller faire la reve-
rence à Messieurs les ducs) je ne puis vous
mander la liste des livres que vous m'avez en-
voyés: ce sera dans la suivante. Je ne doute
point que Messieurs Cuningham n'en ayent eu
tout le soin qu'il faut, et que tout n'ait esté
rendu

A LETTER

From Mr. LEIBNITZ, to Mr.
BURNET of Kemney.

*Begun at Hanover, and forwarded
Wolfenbottle, 24 August. old
Stile, 1697.*

S I R,

I Received at last both your Pacquets, about three or four Weeks ago; and your Letter also was deliver'd me by the Electress herself. I write you this the sooner, because you have order'd me to acknowledge the Receipt of yours. Indeed, as I am at present at *Brunswick* (where the approaching Fair obliged me to pay my Duty to the Dukes) I cannot return you a List of the Books you have sent me, which shall be in the next. There is no Doubt, but that the Messieurs *Cunningham* have taken the utmost Care of them, and

*rendu avec exactitude. Je seray ravi de voir un jour celuy que j'ay vu autres fois à Florence avec Milord Douglas, qui a bien du merite. Je n'ay pas l'honneur de connoistre l'autre, et ne sçay point s'ils sont parens. Le premier me parloit des desseins qu'il avoit sur l'ancienne langue Anglo-Saxone, mais estant tousjours en mouvement il sera difficile qu'il puisse poursuivre ces sortes de pensées. J'ay annoncé à Paris la nouvelle des lettres du President Vargas touchant le Concile de Trente, qu'on publie en Angleterre. J'ay fait en cela la fonction de Heraut, et je ne doute point que cette nouvelle ne mette en allarme tout le quartier du Papisme, comme si Annibal estoit aux portes : Car le concile de Trente est chéri du clergé comme son Palladium. Mais les cours souveraines de France ont d'autres maximes, et celles se sont tousjours opposées à sa reception. Ce que je veux donner touchant ce Concile est une preuve qui fait voir, que du temps du changement de Henry IV. Roy de France, les Prelats mêmes, qui l'instruisirent, le dispenserent de l'obligation de reconnoistre le Concile de Trente dans sa profession de foy. Et qu'ainsi l'autorité de ce Concile estoit petite
alors*

and that every Thing has been carefully delivered. It would give me vast Pleasure to see the Gentleman, of that Name, whom I formerly saw at *Florence* with my Lord *Douglas*, and who has great Merit. I have not the Honour of being acquainted with the other, and know not if they are Relations. The former told me of some Designs he had on the antient *Anglo-Saxon* Tongue; but being constantly in Motion, it will be difficult for him to pursue such Intention. I have sent to *Paris* the News of the President *Varga's* Letters, concerning the Council of *Trent*, publishing in *England*: In that I have performed the Office of a Herald; and doubt not but this News will alarm all the *Quarter* of Popery, as much as if *Hannibal* were at the Gates. For the Council of *Trent* is cherished by the Priesthood as their *Palladium*. But the sovereign Courts of *France* have other Maxims, and have always opposed its Reception. What I shall offer, concerning this Council, is an Evidence which shews, that from the Time of the Conversion of *Henry IV.* King of *France*, the Prelates themselves,

I

who

alors en matiere de foy. Cela paroist par le proces verbal de l'abjuration ou changement du Roy. C'est une piece curieuse, et de consequence Monsieur l'Eveque de Meaux fut surpris, lors que je luy en parlay, car person ne l'a remarqué. Cependant il n'a point osé contredire, et ce procès verbal meriteroit peut estre d'estre imprimé, conjointement avec l'edition Françoisse des Lettres du President Vargas.

*Puisque vous m'offres d'envoyer par la poste, les Catalogues des nouveaux livres, si je les souhaite, je vous diray, Monsieur, que vous nous obligerés fort par là, en les adressant seulement sous mon Couvert à Monsieur nostre Resident, qui s'est offert a moy fort obligeamment, d'avoir soin de tout. Je le pri-
eray meme de faire venir pour nous effectivement plusieurs des livres. Je m'imagine aussi qu'on continue tousjours les Philosophical Transactions. J'ay vû une espee de Mercure galant Anglois, il y a quelques années, mêlée de sciences, des pieces de poesie et de
Musique,*

who instructed him, dispensed with the Obligation he was under of acknowledging the Council of *Trent* in his Profession of Faith : And that therefore the Authority of this Council was then little in Matters of Faith. This appears by the verbal Process of his Abjuration and Conversion. It is a Piece very little known, and consequently the Bishop of *Meaux* was surprized, when I spoke to him of it, for no Body had remark'd it. However, he has not ventur'd to contradict it, and this verbal Process may be worth printing with President *Varga's* Letters.

Since you offer to send me by the Post the Catalogues of new Books, if I desired them ; I must inform you, Sir, that you will very much oblige us by it, only directing them, under Cover to me, to our Resident, who has very obligingly offer'd to take care of all : And I shall even desire him to convey several of the Books for us. I suppose the Philosophical Transactions are still continued. I have seen a kind of *English Mercure Galant*, some Years since, mix'd with Science, Pieces of Poetry and Musick, and other Matters,

Musique, et d'autres matieres, mais je ne sçay, si on le continue encore. Il est vray, que tous les journaux des autres Pays parlent fort peu de vos livres, et c'est dommage qu'il n'y a point quelque sçavant homme en Angleterre, qui travaille à un bon journal, mais il faudroit qu'il fut assez universel pour-cela. Monsieur de la Crose l'estoit effectivement ; et je suis bien fâché de sa mort. Il y a deux ans ou environ, qu'un Ministre François venant de Berlin, et allant chez-vous, me parla en passant à Hanover. Il avoit un journal des Sçavans dans l'esprit, qu'il vouloit faire en Angleterre, mais en Langue Françoisé, comme je crois.

On nous fait esperer, que les Inscriptions de l'incomparable Marquardus Gudius (Conseiller autresfois du Duc de Holstein, qui pouvoit estre mis en parallele avec les Sau-maisis, et les Vossius, et qui avoit des Manuscrits admirables, et des lumieres encore plus grandes que ces Manuscrits en matiere d'antiquités) seront imprimées en Angleterre au Theatre d'Oxford : Je le souhaiterois de tout mon cœur. Il a copié les inscriptions luy même en bonne partie, avec le plus grand soin du Monde : Il a corrigé quantité des
fautes

but I know not if they are still continued. It is true, that all the Journals of other Countries make little mention of your Books ; and it is Pity there is not some ingenious Man in *England*, who would undertake a good Journal, but he ought to be a Man of very general Knowledge. Monsieur *de la Crose* was such in Fact, and I am sorry for his Death. --- About two Years ago, I had a Conversation at *Hanover* with a *French* Minister, going from *Berlin* to *London*, where he intended to write a Journal of the Learned, but, as I believe, in the *French* Tongue.

We are made to hope here, that the Inscriptions of the incomparable *Marquardus Gudius* (formerly Counsellor to the Duke of *Holstein*, who may be rank'd with the *Salmasii*, and the *Vossii*, and who had admirable Manuscripts, and still greater Lights than Manuscripts, in Matters of Antiquity) will be printed in *England* at the Theatre at *Oxford* : I wish it with all my Heart. He has copy'd a good Part of the Inscriptions himself, with the greatest Care in the World : He has cor-

fautes des autres editions, et il a ramassé d'autres inscriptions en tres grand nombre, qui n'ont jamais encore vû le jour. Ce sera une des plus importantes pieces qu'on ait encore vû de long temps. Et si vos Messieurs en regalent le public, on leur en aura une tres grande obligation. Monsieur Gudius a laissé une infinité d'autres belles choses ; mais, on dit, qu'une partie en a esté dissipée. On a fait imprimer quelques lettres de luy, mais ce ne sont pas les meilleures. Monsieur de Spanheim et Monsieur Gudius estoient en meme temps à Rome, et il y eut un agréable combat entre eux, sçavoir si les Medailles ou les Inscriptions estoient les plus utiles, et les plus instructives. Cette sçavante contestation produisit l'excellent livre de Monsieur de Spanheim, De usu et præstantiâ Numismatum, auquel Monsieur Gudius en vouloit opposer une autre ; ou il vouloit monstrier le grand usage des Inscriptions : Mais, comme il estoit trop scrupuleux et réservé, son ouvrage ne parut point. Monsieur Gudius me conta luy meme cette Histoire, et Monsieur de Spanheim me l'a confirmée ; et vous ne serez peut estre point fâché de sçavoir ces particularités. Quand vous ecrires Monsieur, au
celebr

rected many Faults of Editions, and has collected Numbers of other Inscriptions, which were never before published. This will be one of the most important Pieces which has been seen a long Time; and if your Gentlemen entertain the Publick with it, we shall be under great Obligations to them. Mr. *Gudius* left many other fine Things; but, it is said, Part of them are dispersed. There are some Letters of his printed, but they are not the best. *Spanheim* and *Gudius* were at *Rome* at the same Time, and there was an agreeable Contest between them, whether Medals or Inscriptions were the most useful and instructive. This learned Dispute produced *Spanheim's* excellent Book, *De usu et præstantiâ Numismatum*, in Opposition to which, *Gudius* intended a Treatise on the great Use of Inscriptions: But, as he was too scrupulous and reserved, his Performance never appeared. *Gudius* told me this Story himself, and *Spanheim* confirm'd it to me: You perhaps will not be displeased with the Information of these Particulars. (When you write to the celebrated Mr. *Bentley*, I beg you to make my Compliments to him,

celebre Monsieur Bentley, faites luy mes baise-mains je vous en prie ; et l'exhortes a favoriser la publication des inscriptions de feu Monsieur Gudius, dont Monsieur Grævius est le depositaire ; mais sur tout à continuer à enrichir le public de ses propres productions, ou il y a autant de solidité que d'erudition, comme ses incomparables discours pour la religion font voir. Je souhaiterois aussi que quelque sçavant homme prit soin des ouvrages posthumes de l'excellent Monsieur Edouard Bernard, qui estoit aussi à mon avis un ornement de l'Angleterre. Luy et moy, nous fusmes presque receus en meme temps dans la Societé Royale. Il a publié une Table des Caracteres des Lettres de toutes les Nations, et il promettoit un commentaire la dessus. Si ce commentaire se trouvoit ebauché, il faudroit le donner au public, et toutes ses autres compositions, qui se trouveroient tant soit peu en ordre.

Il faut que je vous raconte quelque chose d'une nouvelle guerre en France, entre les Dominicains, et les Jesuites, ou l'Archeveque de Paris a pris le parti des premiers. C'est que le Pere Natalis Alexander, Jacobin ou Dominicain de Paris a attaqué les Jesuites
dans

and intreat him to promote the Publication of *Gudius's* Inscriptions, which are committed to *Grævius*; but above all to continue to enrich the Publick, with his own Productions, which have as much Solidity, as Learning, as appears by his incomparable Discourses in Defence of Religion. I could wish also, that some learned Man took care of the posthumous Works of the excellent Mr. *Edward Bernard*, who was also, in my Opinion, an Ornament to *England*. He and I were admitted about the same Time Members of the Royal Society. He has publish'd a Table of the different Characters of all Nations, and has promised a Comment thereupon. Tho' this Comment should be rough and indigested, it ought to be made Publick; and all his other Compositions, be they never so little in Order.

I must give you some Account of a new War in *France*, between the *Dominicans* and the *Jesuits*, in which the Archbishop of *Paris* takes Part with the former. Father *Natalis Alexander*, a *Jacobin* or *Dominican* of *Paris*, has attack'd the *Jesuits* in

dans son livre de Morale, que l'Archeveque de Paris a fort reCOMMANDÉ dans son Diocese. Ce qui a attiré quelques livres contre l'auteur de la part des Jesuites. L'Auteur y a répondu, et l'Archeveque en a pris la defense dans une Lettre Pastorale, qu'il a adressée à tout son Diocese, ou il semble condamner ce que les Jesuites ont fait contre le livre : La Lettre Pastorale vient tout nouvellement d'estre mise en Latin. Depuis les Jesuites ont adressée une seconde Lettre au Pere Alexandre, dans la quelle ils font un parallele de leur doctrine avec celle des Thomistes, ou Dominicains. Cette Lettre a donné encore occasion à une reponse du Pere Alexandre. Encore l'Archeveque de Reims semble faire la guerre aux Jesuites par un Ordonnance touchant l'approbation des Reguliers de son Diocese. De plus, les Carmes se dechainent, particulièrement contre le Pere Papebroch, et ses Compagnes, Jesuites d'Anvers, qui dans leur Acta Sanctorum n'ont pas voulu ny pû approuver les pretensions plaisantes de ces Religieux, qui nous voudroient faire croire, que le Prophete Elie est leur fondateur. Les Carmes ont eu assez de credit pour faire censurer quelques livres des Jesuites dans

in his Book of *Morality*, which the Archbishop of *Paris* has strongly recommended in his Diocese. This produced some Books on the Part of the *Jesuits* against the Author. The Author has answer'd; and the Archbishop has undertaken his Defence in a Pastoral Letter, directed to his whole Diocese, wherein he seems to condemn what the *Jesuits* have done against the Book: The Pastoral Letter is just put into *Latin*. The *Jesuits* have since addressed a second Letter to Father *Alexander*, in which they make a Comparison of their Doctrine with that of the *Thomists*, or *Dominicans*. This Letter has given further Occasion for a Reply from Father *Alexander*. Besides, the Archbishop of *Rheims* seems to make War on the *Jesuits* by an *Ordonnance* concerning the Approbation of the *Regulars* of his Diocese. Moreover the *Carmelites* exclaim, particularly against Father *Papebroch* and his Companions, *Jesuits* of *Antwerp*, who in their *Acta Sanctorum*, neither will, nor can approve the ridiculous Pretensions of these *Monks*, who would make us believe, that the Prophet *Elias* was their Founder. The
Carmelites

dans l'inquisition d'Espagne. J'ay receu dernièrement l'Apologie du Pere Papebroch contre les Carmes. Si les Jesuites avoient toujours autant de raison, qu'ils en ont dans cette rencontre, ils n'auroient jamais tort. Cependant ces particularités font voir, que ces Peres encore ne sont pas toujours, ny par tout, les plus puissans.

On a fort esté surpris en France, de l'Election du Roy de Pologne, en la Personne de l'Electeur de Saxe; on en a même esté surpris en Allemagne. Car si jamais secret a esté bien gardé, c'a esté celui la. Si l'Electeur avoit brigué auparavant en public, on auroit fait jouer mille Cabales, pour l'exclure. En écrivant à un Saxon de mes amis, je luy dis, qu'il falloit leur faire en même temps des congratulations à cause de la Couronne acquise à leur Prince, et des condoleances à cause de son changement de religion: A peu près comme on fait auprès du Successeur d'un Prince mort, ou les complimens de condoléance, et de congratulation, pari passu ambulant. Mais comme la congratulation l'emporte dans cette dernière rencontre, j'ay peur, que la
condoléance

Carmelites have had Credit enough to procure a Censure of some Books of the *Jesuits* in the Inquisition of *Spain*. I have lately received Father *Papebroch's* Defence against the *Carmelites*. If the *Jesuits* had always as much Reason on their Side, as in this Dispute, they would never be wrong. However, these Particulars shew, that these Fathers are not always, nor every where, the most powerful.

France is much surpriz'd, that the Elector of *Saxony* is chosen King of *Poland*, as are even the *Germans* : For if ever Secret were well kept, this has been. If the Elector had openly sued for it before-hand, there had been a thousand Cabals form'd to exclude him. In writing to a *Saxon*, a Friend of mine, I tell him, that I must at once congratulate them, on the Crown gain'd by their Prince ; and condole with them, on his Change of Religion : Just as we do with the Successor of a deceas'd Prince ; where the Compliments of Condolance and Congratulation, *pari passu ambulant*. But as in the latter Congratulation prevails, in this Case I fear the Condolance will prevail in the Minds of the
Saxons,

condoleance ne l'emporte dans l'esprit de de Messieurs les Saxons, qui temoignent d'estre fort affligés. Cependant le nouveau Roy fait ce qu'il peut maintenant pour les consoler. Il a fait temoigner tant à ses sujets, qu'à d'autres Princes Protestans, qu'il ne pretend pas de rien innover dans le Pays. Il ne sçauroit se proposer en cette rencontre un meilleur modèle que l'exemple du feu duc d'Hanover, Jean Frederic, Frere de l'Electeur de Bronsvic. Ce Prince (qui m'a appellé dans ce pays cy) estoit de la religion Romaine, et sans doute de bonne foy, mais avec une moderation admirable. Il n'a jamais donné aux Estats du Pais, et pas meme aux Ecclesiastiques Protestans le moindre sujet de plainte. Et ce qui pouvoit paroistre plaisant à ceux, qui ne sont pas bien informes des droits. Il exerçoit le droit Episcopal, comme font tous les autres Princes Protestans, conformément à la paix de Munster, malgré tout ce que le Nonce à Cologne, les Vicegerents Apostoliques, et les Religieux Missionnaires, pouvoient dire. Et l'affaire ayant esté portée à Rome, le Pape même prononça pour luy: Car ce Prince faisoit toutes les choses avec beaucoup de circonspection.

Saxons ; who appear to be greatly concern'd. In the mean time, the new King does all he can at present for their Consolation. He has made it known, as well to his Subjects, as to other Protestant Princes, that he does not intend to make any Innovations in his Country. He cannot on this Occasion propose to himself a better Model, than the Example of the late Duke of *Hanover*, *John Frederic*, Brother to the Elector of *Brunswic*. This Prince (who call'd me into this Country) was of the *Romish* Religion, and without Doubt in good Earnest, but with wonderful Moderation. He never gave the States of his Country, nor even the Protestant Ecclesiasticks, the least Cause of Complaint; and what may appear strange to those, who are not well informed of such Rights ; he exercised the Episcopal Right, as the other Protestant Princes do, conformably to the Treaty of *Munster*, notwithstanding all the Nuntio at *Cologne*, the Apostolic Vicegerents, and the Religious Missionaries, could say. And the Affair being carry'd to *Rome*, the Pope himself pronounced in his Favour: For this Prince did all Things with great Circumspection.

I am

circonspection. Je suis d'avis, qu'on fasse chercher chez nous tout ce qui s'est passé dans ces rencontres pour le communiquer au nouveau Roy. Je suis tres marri qu'il n'est plus Protestant, mais enfin il faut le prendre tel qu'il est, et puisque c'est un Prince d'un tres grand merite, et qui a des qualites tout à fait heroïques, les Estats de Saxe feront bien de menager son esprit, et de ne rien faire qui le puisse aigrir; car il pourroit prendre son temps pour les en faire repentir un jour. Au lieu que s'ils luy temoignent leur affection, non obstant son changement, et leur douleur, il en usera tousjours avec eux d'une maniere moderée, comme son interest le demande : Et j'espere que la consideration, qu'il a pour le Roy de la Grande Bretagne, y contribuera beaucoup. Cependant les Lutheriens ont perdu maintenant leur Pape, fait Papiste, et il faut qu'ils ayent recours à un Pape reformé. Car il faut sçavoir, que l'Electeur de Saxe estoit le Directeur des Protestans, tant Lutheriens que Calvinistes, de l'Empire dans les dietes, et dans toutes les autres occasions. Maintenant cette direction pourroit estre referée à l'Electeur de Brandebourg,

I am of Opinion, that every Thing, which passed in this Affair, should be sought out to communicate to the new King. I am very sorry he is no longer a Protestant: But after all we must take him as he is; and since he is a Prince of great Merit, and who has Qualities altogether Heroic, the States of *Saxony* will do well to manage his Disposition, and do nothing that may sour him, for he may take a Time one Day or other to make them repent it. Whereas, if they testify their Affection to him, notwithstanding his Change, and their Concern, he will always treat them with Moderation, as his Interest requires; and I hope his Regard for the King of *Great Britain* will greatly contribute to it. Nevertheless, the *Lutherans* have now lost their Pope, become a Papist, and they must have Recourse to a reform'd * Pope. For you must know, the Elector of *Saxony* was the Director of the Protestants of the Empire, both *Lutherans* and *Calvinists*, in the Diets, and on all other Occasions. This Direction may now be transfer'd to

* The Word *reform'd* in this and the following Page means *Calvinist*.

bourg, non obstant qu'il est reformé. Aussi est il vray qu'autres fois avant que l'Electorat fut transformé sur Baviere, le Comte Palatin, quoique reformé, estoit aussi Directeur des Protestans. Quant a moy j'ay tousjours crû, et publié hautement dans toutes les recontres, que la difference entre les nostres et les vostres est de nulle consequence, et qu'il est tres inutile, et même tres dommageable de contester avec aigreur sur des questions, qui n'ont point d'influence sur la pratique de la piété, et sur l'essentiel du Christianisme. Nous aurons bien tost une seconde Edition du livre de l'incomparable Georgius Calixtus, de Helmstât, sur ce sujet ; avec une préface, et quelques additions de son fils, qui est aussi son successeur dans la chaire de Theologie.

Mais je m'écarte trop de nostre Electeur, maintenant Roy de Pologne. Les Polonnois ont en autresfois de la Saxe leur religion et leur loix. Car ils reconnoissoient, in spiritualibus, l'Archeveque de Magdebourg, et il suivoient le droit Saxon jusqu'à demander, à Scabinis Saxonix, les decisions de leur questions ; et le droit Polonnois estoit
appellé

the Elector of *Brandenburg*, notwithstanding he is reform'd. It is true, that formerly, before *Bavaria* was form'd into an Electorate, the Count *Palatine*, tho' reform'd, was also Director of the Protestants. As for myself I have always believ'd, and loudly publish'd on all Occasions, that the Difference betwixt us and you is of no Consequence; and that it is very useless, and even prejudicial to dispute with Eagerness on Questions, which have no Influence on the Practice of Piety, and on the Essentials of Christianity. We shall soon have a second Edition of the Book of the incomparable *Georgius Calixtus*, of *Helmstat*, on this Subject; with a Preface and some Additions by his Son, who succeeds him in the Divinity Chair.

But I ramble too far from our Elector, now King of *Poland*. The *Poles* had formerly their Religion and Laws from *Saxony*. For they acknowledge, *in spiritualibus*, the Archbishop of *Magdebourg*, and they follow the *Saxon* Laws even to the demanding, *à Scabinis Saxoniae*, the Decisions of their Questions; and the *Polish* Law was call'd *Jus Magdeburgicum*: This

*appellé Jus Magdeburgicum : Cela m'a fait
faire cette Epigramme.*

*Ut quondam Leges, ita nunc a Saxone regem
Sarmata, qui regnum juraq; fervet, habet.*

*Si Dieu ne l'empêche pour nos pechés, cette
Election du Roy de Pologne pourroit causer
la ruine de l'Empire Ottoman dans l'Europe;
car c'est un Prince, dont la valeur et la
puissance sont capables d'animer une nation
guerriere, et la jonction de cette nation avec
les Allemands et les Moscovites peut estre
fatale aux Turcs.*

*Et si fata volunt, Cæsar, Czar, Saxoq; juncti
Europâ poterunt pellere barbariem.*

*A propos des Moscovites il faut que je vous
parle de la Grande Ambassade de cet Em-
pire, ou le Monarque même se trouve incog-
nito. Nous les avons vû en passant dans le
voisinage. Quoique ce Prince n'ait pas nos
manieres, il ne laisse pas d'avoir beaucoup
d'esprit. Le premier Ambassadeur s'appelle
Monsieur le Fort, Genevois, le second est
Gouverneur de Siberie, le même qui a esté
Chef*

occasioned me to make the following Epigram.

*Ut quondam Leges, ita nunc a Saxone regem
Sarmata, qui regnum juraque servet, habet.*

If God for our Sins does not prevent it, this Election of the King of *Poland* might destroy the *Ottoman* Empire in *Europe*; for he is a Prince, whose Courage and Power are sufficient to animate a warlike Nation, and the Junction of this Nation with the *Germans* and *Muscovites* may be fatal to the *Turks*.

*Et si fata volunt, Cæsar, Czar, Saxoque juncti
Europâ poterunt pellere barbariem.*

Now I mention the *Muscovites* I must tell you of the grand Embassy of this Empire, where the Monarch himself comes *incognito*. We saw them as they passed in the Neighbourhood. Tho' this Prince has not our Manners, he is nevertheless a Man of great Understanding. The first Ambassador is called *Monsieur le Fort*, a *Genevese*, the second is the Governor of *Siberia*, the same who was

Chef des Troupes Moscovites opposées aux Chinois, et Plenipotentiaire du Czar, et apparemment le même avec le quel le Pere Gerbillon, Jesuite François, comme Interprète des Chinois, avoit traité à Nipchou dans la Tartarie Orientale. Le troisieme Ambassadeur est le Grand Chancelier de l'Empire. Le Czar (qui parle un peu Hollandois ou Allemand) a dit à Mesdames les Electrices de Brandebourg et de Bronsvic (qui souperent avec luy dans le chasteau de Coppenbruc, appartenant à Monseigneur l'Electeur de Bronsvic, ou on le traita) qu'il fait bastir 75 vaisseaux de guerre, qu'il veut employer sur la Mër Noire. Il ne pense presentement, qu'à incommoder les Turcs; et son grand plaisir est la Marine, qu'il a appris, et apprend en perfection, ayant en veue de se rendre maistre du Pont Euxin. Il sera maintenant en Hollande comme je crois, ou il veut s'instruire personnellement, sur tout ce qui regarde Navigation, et on croit qu'il se transportera jusqu'à Venise pour y voir les galeres, et la fameux Arsenal. Au reste, il veut absolument estre incognito, et qu'on fasse semblant de ne le point connoistre.

Ce

General of the *Muscovite* Troops against the *Chinese*, and the *Czar's* Plenipotentiary, and apparently the same with whom Father *Gerbillon*, a *French* Jesuit, as Interpreter for the *Chinese*, treated at *Nipchou* in *Eastern Tartary*. The third Ambassador is the Great Chancellor of the Empire. The *Czar* (who speaks a little *Dutch* or *German*) told the Electresses of *Brandenbourg* and *Brunswic* (who supp'd with him in the Castle of *Coppenbruc*, belonging to the Elector of *Brunswic*, where he was entertained) that he was building 75 Ships of War, which he intended to employ on the *Black* Sea. He thinks of nothing at present, but annoying the *Turks*, and his great Pleasure is the *Marine*, which he has learn'd, and is Learning in Perfection, having in View the rendering himself Master of the *Euxine* Sea. I believe he will be soon in *Holland*, where he will in Person inform himself, of all Things, belonging to Navigation; and it is believed he will go even to *Venice* to see the Gallies, and the famous Arsenal there. He insists on being absolutely *incognito*, and that People should seem not to know him.

Ce n'est qu'en presence des Electrices qu'il a voulu passer pour ce qu'il est.

Il faut que je vous supplie encore Monsieur de faire mes Complemens à Monsieur Lock, que je remercie tres humblement des pieces considerables de sa façon, qu'il m'a fait envoyer. J'ay déjà commencé à lire ce qu'il a fait sur la monnoye ; on ne sçauroit rien dire de plus solide ny de mieux sensé. Et ces pretendus haussiemens de monnoye sont chimeriques, tandis qu'on n'a pas moyen d'empêcher les gens de hausser le prix des denrées et autres choses. Nous avons même trouvé en Allemagne un plus mechant effect. C'est que ces deux haussiemens ne vont pas à proportion, comme ils devroient, tant a cause de la negligence de ceux, qui doivent avoir soin de la Police, qu'à cause des mauvais artifices des marchands et autres, qui haussent les prix des choses au dela du haussément de la monnoye, ce qui cause une perte notable au Public. Sur tout les marchands estrangers y gagnent, et la perte tombe sur les naturels du pays, qui ne peuvent pas aussi hausser à proportion leur denrées, comme nous l'avons experimenté en Allemagne. Les marchands prennent pour pretexte de leur haussément excessif, l'inegalité de

But in the Presence of the Electresses he was willing to pass for what he is.

I must beg you farther, Sir, to make my Compliments to Mr. *Lock*, whom I humbly thank for those valuable Pieces of his, which he caused to be sent me. I have already begun to read what he has done on Coin, nothing can be said more solid and judicious. The pretended Rise of Money is chimerical, while we have not the Means of hindering People from raising the Price of Provisions, and other Things. We have found in *Germany* a still worse Effect; it is that these two Rises of Money are not in a due Proportion, as well by Reason of the Negligence of those, who should take care of the Police, as by Reason of the evil Artifices of Merchants and others, who raise the Price of Things beyond the Rise of Money, which causes a remarkable Loss to the Public. Besides the foreign Merchants gain by it, and the Loss falls on the Natives of the Country, who cannot also raise their Commodities in Proportion, as we have experienced in *Germany*. The Merchant takes a Pretext, for his excessive Increase, from the Inequality
of

de la mechante monnoye, ou (pour parler favorablement de ces corruptions) de la monnoye haussée. Car quoique les plus grands Princes de l'Empire eussent réglé les choses sur un certain pied, en vertu du quel un demi écu en espee a esté enfin haussé a la valeur de deux tiers d'écu courant, neantmoins quantité des petits Seigneurs et Villes, qui ont droit de battre monnoye, sont allés bien plus bas ; ce qui a fait naistre une confusion horrible : et les marchands ce sont réglés suivant la plus mechante monnoye pour estre plus seurs. Toutes les remonstrances n'ont de rien servi ; et le pis a esté qu'on a alteré terriblement l'alloy. Il n'y a que la maison de Bronsvic qui ait maintenu le bon alloy ; au lieu qu'ailleurs plusieurs ont tout brouillé pour pescher en eau troublé. La monnoye d'argent de Bronsvic, qu'on bat au Hartz, est absolument la meilleure de l'Europe, et il faut que la votre même baisse pavillon devant elle ; car la nostre est de fin argent, et nous refutons, par l'experience, les interessés aux monnoyes, qui sont bien aises de faire croire aux gens qu'on ne doit point battre fin. Cependant nous faisons battre fin jusqu'à 500 mille écus et au delà par an, et les moindres de nos pieces de fin

of the bad Money, or (to speak tender of these Corruptions) from the Rise of Money. For tho' the greatest Princes of the Empire had regulated Things on a certain Foot, by Virtue of which a half Crown in Specie has been at length raised to the Value of two Thirds of a current Crown ; nevertheless, several inferior Lords and Towns, who have a Right to stamp Money, have gone much lower ; which has produced a terrible Confusion : and the Merchants regulate themselves by the worst Money to be more sure. All Remonstrances have been of no Service ; and the worst is, the Allay is wretchedly alter'd. The House of *Brunswic* only has preserved the good Allay ; whereas many others have confused every Thing for the Sake of fishing in troubled Waters. The Silver Money of *Brunswic*, which is stamp'd at *Hartz*, is absolutely the best in *Europe*, and even yours must yield to it ; for ours is of fine Silver, and we refute, by Experience, such as are interested in Moneys, who are glad to make People believe, that no fine Silver should be coin'd. Nevertheless, we stamp to 500,000 Crowns and more
every

fin argent sont une 36me partie d'un écu. Je crois que Monsieur Lock sera bien aise de sçavoir cela. Car je juge par son livre, qu'il n'a point sçû ces particularités, ayant este obligé d'ajouter foy a l'opinion vulgaire, qui ne veut pas qu'on batte fin pour des raisons peu solides. Un sçavant Jurisconsulte Allemand a fait imprimer quantite d'actes ou negotiations sur la monnoye passées dans le trois cercles de l'Empire, Franconie, Baviere, et Suabe, qui ont correspondance entre eux sur ce sujet. On m'a parlé de discours que le Grand Copernic a fait autres fois sur la monnoye, et je m'en informeray.

A propos de Copernic, qui estoit Borussien, un autre Borussien, nomme Schulz, à fait un livre, ou il pretend prouver Poloniam nunquam fuisse tributariam Imperio, Il se trompe. Elle estoit plus que tributaire, car elle estoit sujette. On nous fait esperer des memoires d'un Gentilhomme de Neurenberg, qu'on pretend avoir connu l'Amerique avant Columbe. Monsieur Wagenfeil, qui en a parle dans un ouvrage de Geographie, vient
de

every Year, and the least of our Pieces of fine Silver is a 36th Part of a Crown. I believe Mr. *Locke* will be glad to know This. For I judge by his Book, that he was not acquainted with these Particulars, having been obliged to give Credit to the vulgar Opinion, which does not allow the stamping Fine for Reasons not very solid. A learned *German* Lawyer has printed several Acts or Negotiations on Money, which pass'd in the three Circles of the Empire, *Franconia*, *Bavaria*, and *Swabia*, which have Correspondence between themselves on this Subject. I have been told of a Discourse, which the great *Copernicus* formerly made on Money, and I shall inform myself about it.

Now I mention *Copernicus*, who was a *Prussian*, another *Prussian*, named *Schulz*, has written a Book, where he pretends to prove *Poloniam nunquam fuisse tributariam Imperio*. He is mistaken. It was more than tributary, for it was subject. We are given to hope for the Memoirs of a Gentleman of *Nuremberg*, who is said to have known *America* before *Columbus*. Monsieur *Wagenseil*, who makes mention
of

de publier un ſçavant livre, intitulé, Memorabilia Noriberga, ou il a joint une diſſertation, qui contient une conjecture fort plausible de Origine Cingarorum, qu'on appelle vulgairement Ægyptiens, ou Bohemiens. Il y a mis auſſi une diſſertation, Vom Merſterſang, ou des vieux poëtes Allemands de temps rudes, dont il y a encor des reliques parmy le peuple, que les vieillards conſervent ſoigneuſement. Cette diſſertation eſt curieuſe, comme eſt tout ce qui ſe fait par cet auteur, qui eſt Ju-riſconſulte, mais d'une erudition univerſelle, il excelle ſur tout dans l'Hebreu et dans les Rabbins. Monsieur Cluver de la Societé Royale, qui eſt Holſatien, mais qui a demeuré long temps en Angleterre, m'a envoyé une diſſertation ſur une Medaille Astrologique, qu'il a fait battre, qui repreſente l'Horoscope de l'Empereur.

Je repondray une autre fois, Monsieur, aux articles de voſtre poſtſcriptum, qui demandent un papier a part. Les vies de M. Seth Ward; Eveque de Sarum, et de M. Wilkins, Eveque de Cheſter, ſeront inſtruc-tives. Ceſtoient deux excellents hommes. Jeſ-
pere

of it in a Geographical Work, has just published a learned Book, intituled, *Memorabilia Noriberga*, to which he has subjoin'd a Dissertation, containing a very plausible Conjecture *de Origine Cingarorum*, whom we vulgarly call **Ægyptians*, or *Bohemians*. He has also added a Dissertation, *Vom Merstersang*, or of some old German Poets of rude Times, of whose Works there are still remains among the People, and which the old Men carefully preserve. This Dissertation is very curious, as is every Thing of this Author, who is a Lawyer, but of Univeral Erudition, and above all excells in the *Hebrew* and *Rabbinical* Learning. Mr. *Cluver* of the Royal Society, who is of *Holstein*, but has liv'd a long while in *England*, has sent me a Dissertation on an Astrological Medal, which he has caused to be struck, representing the Emperor's Horoscope.

I shall reply some other time, Sir, to the Articles of your Postscript, which require a Letter a-part. The Lives of *Seth Ward*, Bishop of *Salisbury*, and of *Wilkins*, Bishop of *Chester*, will be very instructive. They were two excellent Men. I hope,

* Gypsies.

that

père que Monsieur Pape Blunt sera entré dans le detail de leur pensées. J'ay considéré avec attention le grand ouvrage du Caractere reel, et Langage Philosophique de Monsieur Wilkins. Je trouve qu'il y a mis une infinité de belles choses, et nous n'avons jamais eu une Table des Predicamens plus accomplie. Mais l'application pour les caracteres, et pour la Langue, n'est point conforme à ce qu'on pouvoit et devoit faire. J'avois considéré cette matiere avant le livre de Monsieur Wilkins, quand j'estois un jeune homme de dix neuf ans, dans mon petit livre de arte combinatoria, et mon opinion est que ces caracteres veritablement reels et philosophiques doivent repondre a l'Analyse des pensées. Il est vray que ces caracteres pre-supposent la veritable Philosophie, et ce n'est que presentement que j'oserois entreprendre de les fabriquer. Les Objections de M. Dalgarius, et de M. Wilkins, contre la methode veritablement philosophique ne sont que pour excuser l'imperfection de leur essais, et marquent seulement les difficultés qui les en ont rebutés. J'ay plaint la mort prématurée de M. Wharton, dont on pouvoit attendre encore des belles choses. Puisqu'on a les originaux des Lettres du President

Vargas

that Mr. *Pope Blunt* enters into the Particulars of their Thoughts. I have attentively consider'd the great Work of Mr. *Wilkins's* real Character, and Philosophical Language: I find he has thrown in an infinite Number of fine Things; and we have never had a more compleat Table of *Predicaments*. But the Application for the Characters, and for the Language, is not conformable to what might, and ought to be done. I had consider'd this Matter, before Mr. *Wilkins's* Book appear'd, when I was a young Man of nineteen, in a little Book *de arte combinatoria*; and my Opinion is, that the Characters truly real and philosophick ought to answer to the Analysis of the Thoughts. Indeed these Characters pre-suppose the true Philosophy, which at present is not what I would undertake to compose. The Objections of *Dalgarus*, and of *Wilkins* against the Method truly philosophick, are only to excuse the Faults of their Essays; and shew only the Difficulties which have stopp'd them. I am concerned at the premature Death of Mr. *Wharton*, from whom we might have expected other fine Things.

L

Since

Vargas, on ne doit point craindre que les Romanistes osent s'inscrire en faux contre leur authenticité. Il n'y a que les ignorans qui puissent estre capables de ces doutes. Pour bien faire la vie de Mahomet, auteur de la religion des Sarrafins, il faudroit consulter les Manuscrits Arabes, autrement on court risque de se tromper.

Je liray avec attention les Amœbæa de Monsieur l'Eveque de Worcester, et de Monsieur Lock. Je ne doute point que celui-ci ne se tire fort bien d'affaire. Il a trop de jugement pour donner prise a Messieurs les Ecclesiastiques, qui sont les Directeurs naturels des peuples, et dont il faut suivre les formulaires autant qu'il est possible. Et j'ay deja remarqué dans les endroits que j'ay vûs d'abord que Monsieur Lock se justifie d'une maniere tres solide. Il m'est arrivé quelque chose d'approchant avec le celebre Monsieur Arnaud : Il avoit vû quelque chose de moy, et il avoit crû y trouver des mauvaises consequences, mais quand il eut vû mes explications, il me dechargea hautement luy meme,

et

Since we have the Originals of President *Vargas's* Letters, we need not fear the *Romanists* venturing to undertake any Charge against their Authenticity: None but the ignorant are capable of Doubting it. To make a good Life of *Mahomet*, Author of the Religion of the *Saracens*, the *Arabian* Manuscripts should be consulted, otherwise there is great Danger of being deceiv'd.

I shall read with Attention the *Amœbæa* of the Bishop of *Worcester*, and Mr. *Lock*. I doubt not but the latter will acquit himself very well. He has too much Judgment to give Offence to the Ecclesiasticks, who are the natural Directors of the People, and whose Formularies must be follow'd as much as possible. And I have already remark'd in the Passages I immediately dipp'd into, that Mr. *Lock* justifies himself with great Solidity. Something of a like Nature happen'd to me with the famous Mr. *Arnaud*: He had seen a Performance of mine, which he thought chargeable with some bad Consequences; but when he had my Explications, he himself openly clear'd me;

et quoique nous ne fussions pas d'accord en tout, il ne laissa pas de reconnoître, que mes sentimens n'avoient rien de mauvais. Je m'imagine qu'il pourra arriver la même chose à l'égard de M. de Worcester, car les sentimens peuvent demeurer differens sans estre dangereux ou reprehensibles. Je vous ay marqué autresfois en quoy je differe un peu moy même de Monsieur Locke, et je seray bien aise d'en avoir un jour vostre sentiment. Les miens en Philosophie approchent un peu d'avantage de ceux de feu Madame la Comtesse de Conway, et tiennent le milieu entre Platon et Democrite; puisque je croy que tout se fait mechaniquement comme veulent Democrite et Des Cartes contre l'opinion de M. More, et ses sembables; et que neantmoins tout ce fait encore vitalelement, et suivant les causes finales, tout estant plein de vie et de Perception, contre l'opinion des Democriticiens. Un ami d'Hollande me demanda, si mes remarques sur les Essais de Monsieur Lock ne pourroient pas estre joints a la nouvelle Edition d'Hollande, mais je m'en excusay, car il auroit esté injuste de publier dans son propre ouvrage quelque chose, qui

auroit

and tho' we did not agree in every Particular, he failed not to acknowledge that my Sentiments had nothing bad in them. I imagine the same Thing may happen in regard to the Bishop of *Worcester*, for Sentiments may be different without being dangerous or reprehensible. I have heretofore observed to you in what I differ a little from Mr. *Lock*, and I shall be glad to have your Opinion of it some Day or other. My Sentiments in Philosophy come somewhat nearer those of the late Countess of *Conway*, and keep a Medium betwixt *Plato* and *Democritus*; since I believe, that every Thing is made mechanically, as *Democritus* and *Des Cartes* advance against the Opinion of Dr. *More*, and others; and nevertheless, that every Thing is made vitally, and according to final Causes, all being full of Life and Perception against the Opinion of the Disciples of *Democritus*. A Friend of mine in *Holland* enquires, whether my Remarks on Mr. *Lock's* Essays might not be join'd to the new *Dutch* Edition, but I excused myself, for it had been unjust to publish,

auroit pû paroître fait contre luy, sans luy donner lieu d'y joindre sa reponse.

Vous me parles, Monsieur, des additions de Monsieur Bentley au livre de Monsieur Wotton sur l'accroissement des Sciences, et la preference des modernes. Je n'ay jamais vû ce que c'est que ce livre de Monsieur Wotton. Si Monsieur Bentley prononce pour les modernes (comme je croy qu'il fera) les defen-seurs des anciens ne sçauront plus resister; car sa grande connoissance de ce que l'antiquité a de plus beau, et son equité ne permettent point qu'on le refuse, ny qu'on appelle de son jugement. Je tache de trouver les regles de la Chancellerie Apostolique, et la declaration que vous soubaites. Un Mathematicien de Suede, nomme M. Bilberg, a publié non pas le voyage du Roy de Suede, comme on vous l'a dit, mais le sien fait par Ordre du Roy, aux extremities du Royaume, ou le Soleil ne se couche point durant les nuits d'esté. Nos libraires ne l'ont point. Il est vray que le Roy y avoit esté luy même l'année auparavant. Je sbercheray quelques livres pour vous que j'esperere

with his own Works, any Thing that might seem to be written against him, without giving him room to subjoin his own Answer.

You mention'd to me, Sir, Mr. *Bentley's* Additions to Mr. *Wotton's* Book on the Increase of Science, and the Preference of the Moderns : I have never seen what this Book of Mr. *Wotton's* is. If Mr. *Bentley* pronounces in Favour of the Moderns (as I believe he will) the Advocates for the Antients can hold out no longer ; for his great Knowledge of all that is valuable in Antiquity, and his Candour, admit of no Exceptions, nor of any Appeal from his Judgment. I am endeavouring to find the Rules of the Apostolick Chancery, and the Declaration which you desire. A Mathematician of *Sweden*, one Mr. *Bilberg*, has publish'd, not the King of *Sweden's* Voyage, as you have been told, but his own, by the King's Order, to the Extremities of the Kingdom, where the Sun goes not down during the Summer Nights. Our Book-sellers have it not. It is true the King himself was there the Year before. I shall

pere ne vous devoir point deplaire, et je les enverray a Hambourg suivant vos ordres.

Monsieur Bernoulli, Professeur à Bâle, ayant resolu aussi le probleme de la ligne Brachystochrone de Monsieur son frere, Professeur à Groningue, a peu pres, comme Monsieur Newton et moy, a proposé en même temps a son frere d'autres problemes dans les Actes de Leipzig, que celui-cy a aussi resolu, mais sa solution n'a pas encore esté publiée. Il se trouve que ma Methode pour l'autre probleme de Groningue de la ligne, dont plusieurs points font une même effect, est justement celle de Monsieur Newton, au lieu que la Methode de Messieurs Bernoulli en estoit toute differente.

*Vous nous faites un beau pourtrait, Monsieur, de Madame Stillingfleet, et encore de feu Monsieur Horneck, qui estoit originaire du Palatinat, et j'ay connu ses parens. Les Ecclesiastiques capables de toucher et de pousser les hommes à la véritable pieté ne sçauroient estre assez estimés. Cependant il faut user de discretion dans les pratiques de
devotion*

seek out for some Books for you, which I hope will not displease you, and will send them to *Hamburg* according to your Directions.

Monfieur *Bernoulli*, Profeflor at *Bafil*, having alfo folv'd the Problem of the *Brachyftochronal* Line of his Brother, Profeflor at *Groninguen*, very near as Mr. *Newton* and I did, has propos'd at the fame time to his Brother other Problems in the Acts of *Leipfig*, which the latter has alfo folv'd, but his Solution has not been yet published. It is found, that my Method for the other *Groninguen* Problem of the Line, (many Points of which have the fame Effect) is exactly that of Mr. *Newton*, whereas Mef- fieurs *Bernoulli*'s Method was quite different from it.

You give us a fine Picture of Mrs. *Stillingfleet*, and alfo of the late Mr. *Horneck*, who was originally of the Palatinate, and I knew his Relations. Ecclefiasticks able to move and force Men to true Piety cannot be enough esteem'd. Nevertheless Discretion fhould be us'd in the Exercifes of Devotion. God has placed us in the
World

devotion. Dieu nous a mis dans le monde pour agir suivant sa volonté, et non pas pour luy faire des harangues et des complemens. J'estime véritablement pieux ceux, qui ont des grands sentimens de la sagesse de Dieu, et qui ont de l'ardeur pour faire du bien, se conformant à sa volonté autant qu'il est en leur pouvoir. Rien ne sert plus à la solide devotion que la véritable philosophie, qui fait connoître et admirer les merveilles de Dieu, et qui en publie la gloire comme il faut. Car comment peut on aimer Dieu, et le glorifier, sans en connoître la beauté ? Mais le but de tout est la pratique des vertus morales pour le bien public, ou (ce qui est la même chose) pour la gloire de Dieu. Ainsi toute devotion, qui ne nous propose pas quelque verité considerable sur les perfections et ouvrages de Dieu, ou qui ne tend point à produire quelque bien, est une simple ceremonie, qui ne doit servir qu'à exciter les hommes à ce qu'il y a de reel dans la pieté. Au lieu que beaucoup de devots, contents de leur façons, negligent le solide. Ainsi on voit qu'encore les directeurs des ames, et les devots, auroient besoin d'instruction et de reforme. Mais laissons en le
soin

World to perform his Will, and not to make Harangues and Compliments to him. I look on those to be truly pious, who have great Sentiments of the Wisdom of God, and who have an Ardour to do good, conforming themselves to his Will, as much as is in their Power. Nothing conduces more to true Devotion than true Philosophy, which makes us know and admire the Wonders of God, and display his Glory as we ought. For how can we love God, and glorify him, without knowing the Beauty of his Works? But the End of all is the Practice of the Moral Virtues for the Public Good, or (which is the same Thing) for the Glory of God. Thus all Devotion, which does not propose to us some considerable Truth relating to the Perfection and Works of God, or tending to produce some Good, is meer Ceremony, which should never be apply'd, but to excite Men to real Piety: Whereas many devout Persons, contented with the Form, neglect the Substance. Thus we see even that the spiritual Guides and pious Persons, stand in need of Instruction

soin à Monsieur Stillingfleet,, et ses semblables ; pour moy je suis avec zele,

Vostre tres humble,

et tres obeissant Serviteur,

LEIBNITZ.

P. S. Monsieur, vous en userés de mes Lettres comme il vous plaira, et vous les communiqueres a qui vous le jugeres à propos.

F I N.

tion and Reformation. But let us leave
this Care to Mr. *Stillingfleet*, and others
like him: For my Part, I am with Zeal,

Your most humble,

and most obedient Servant,

LEIBNITZ.

P. S. Sir, you will make what Use of
my Letters you please, and com-
municate them to who you think
proper.

F I N I S.

E R R A T A.

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